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PREDICTIVE FACTS
Brent Ferguson*
Abstract: A substantial portion of constitutional law rests on untested factual predictions
made by the Supreme Court. Such forecasts have played a large role in a wide range of case
outcomes, helping the Court decide questions such as whether corporations have the right to
spend money on elections and what evidence may be used in criminal cases despite Fourth
Amendment violations.
Scholars have not yet studied the frequency of such predictions, the problems they create,
or the functions they serve. The literature has looked more closely at court decisions that
depend on conclusions of legislative fact—facts not specific to a certain plaintiff or defendant
but concerning the world more generally, such as the finding in Brown v. Board of Education
that school segregation caused psychological harm to children. And after scholars began to
recognize how important such factual conclusions were, courts increased their reliance on
empirical evidence when declaring legislative facts. But this Article contends that the Supreme
Court has often circumvented the pressure to rely on evidence by recharacterizing its factual
conclusions as predictions. Thus, for instance, rather than concluding that a longstanding law
regulating newspapers has discouraged political discussion, the Court has simply asserted that
the law would discourage such discussion if it were upheld. And rather than concluding that
minority viewpoints are sufficiently represented on juries even in states with no jury unanimity
requirement, the Court has predicted that minority viewpoints will be heard even without the
unanimity rule. By deciding cases in this manner, the Court has made predictions that operate
as if they are legislative facts even when it performs no factual inquiry.
The Article first looks closely at a set of cases in which such predictive factfinding has
occurred, including those in which a law has existed for decades, but the Court has not asked
whether there is existing evidence that the predicted outcome has happened. While conceding
that predictive judgments are necessary in many cases, the Article nonetheless insists that the
Court should approach those judgments cautiously. That is because the Court’s predictions are
frequently incorrect, and they can create factual precedent by enshrining erroneous conclusions
into law that lower courts adhere to even if facts change or the prediction is proven incorrect.
Further, making unsupported predictions threatens the adversarial system because predictions
are often made by amici or judges rather than the parties to a case. Finally, the prevalence of
unsupported predictions may be undermining the judiciary’s legitimacy.
The Court can start to remedy the problem by recognizing its existence and avoiding
unnecessary predictions. When predictions are unavoidable, the Supreme Court and lower
courts can try to improve the accuracy of their forecasts, consider remanding the case for more
factual development, or issue a provisional decision that would encourage future litigation if a
prediction turns out to be incorrect.

*
Many thanks to Professors Vince Blasi, Richard Briffault, Allison Orr Larsen, Michael Coenen, and
Michael Gilbert, as well as Megan DeMarco, who all provided insightful comments that helped shape
this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Facts about the world are central to many court cases, and the way
courts determine those facts is critical to the content of American law.
Recently, the Supreme Court has moved toward a more empirical,
pragmatic approach to its jurisprudence—if, for instance, the Court is
considering whether violent video games lead children to act aggressively,
chances are it will rely on empirical evidence rather than pure intuition.
Though there is plenty of criticism about how the Court uses such
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evidence, scholars have approved of the Court’s increased reliance on
evidence when it describes how the world works.
But the Court does not always shy away from using intuition rather
than evidence—this Article contends that judges often avoid citing
empirical evidence by phrasing factual conclusions as predictions. And
when a court makes such a prediction, although the prediction operates as
a fact, the Court often fails to engage in a factual inquiry and uses only
logic or speculation to reach an answer. For example, in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,1 the Court invalidated a law requiring
newspapers to provide an opportunity for political candidates to respond
to criticism, and it based that decision on a prediction that the law would
discourage political discussion in newspapers.2 The opinion did not
address whether there was evidence that the sixty-year-old law had indeed
dampened political coverage in the past. And in 2019 in Rucho v. Common
Cause,3 the Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims are
nonjusticiable based in part on a prediction that deciding such cases would
lead to “unprecedented” judicial intervention into politics that “would be
unlimited in scope and duration” and “would recur over and over again
around the country with each new round of districting.”4 The Court
offered no evidentiary support for its concern.
Such predictions are prevalent and will continue to form the basis for
foundational parts of American jurisprudence: in Trump v. Vance,5 the
President’s lawyers asked the Supreme Court to stop a grand jury
investigation involving the President’s personal financial documents
based on a prediction that such an investigation would interfere with
Presidential responsibilities.6 The Supreme Court and the lower courts in
that case based their decisions on predictions about whether “complying
with state criminal subpoenas would necessarily distract the Chief
Executive from his duties.”7

1. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
2. See id. at 257.
3. 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
4. Id. at 2507.
5. 591 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
6. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–5, 9–10, Trump v. Vance, 591 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2412
(2020) (No. 19-635) [hereinafter Trump v. Vance Transcript of Oral Argument].
7. Trump, 140 S. Ct. at 2425–26; see also Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631, 641 n.12 (2d Cir. 2019);
Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d 283, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“In fact, not every criminal proceeding
to which a President may be subjected would raise the grim specters the DOJ Memos portray as
incapacitation of the President, as impeding him from discharging official duties, or as hamstringing
‘the operation of the whole governmental apparatus.’” (quoting Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon,
Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. Of Legal Couns. (Sept. 24, 1973), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/09
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While some predictions are inevitable and advisable, those that serve
as a stand-in for empirically based fact-finding can lead to erroneous
outcomes. And sometimes predictions create damaging factual
precedents—findings of fact that most lower courts feel bound to accept
without asking whether circumstances have changed or if new evidence
has shed light on whether the original prediction was correct.8 The
practice of predictive factfinding weakens the adversarial system because
judges often make predictions (based on intuition or an amicus brief) even
if no party has briefed the issue. Unsupported predictions may also
damage the judiciary’s legitimacy because it is more difficult to trust an
institution that reaches verifiably incorrect conclusions, especially if
observers believe that courts disguise the real reasons for their decisions.
Despite the prevalence and importance of such predictions, neither
judges nor scholars have attempted to quantify or classify them, determine
their level of accuracy, explore the problems they cause, or figure out how
to improve them. This Article begins attempting to understand when and
why the Supreme Court makes predictions the way it does, looks at some
of the consequences, and makes some initial suggestions for improving
the prediction process.
Part I of the Article defines legislative facts—general facts not specific
to a plaintiff or defendant—and explains that courts now commonly cite
empirical evidence when finding a legislative fact. Despite significant
scholarly attention to legislative factfinding, scholars have not explored
how some legislative facts are predictive—instead of describing the world
as it is, predictive legislative facts make a forecast about what would
happen if a certain law or court decision were implemented. These
forecasts generate what I call findings of “predictive facts”—
determinations that, though not strictly factual, nevertheless end up
serving the same function as legislative facts.
Part II looks closely at four cases in which the Supreme Court has
engaged in predictive factfinding, and it mentions many other cases that
follow a similar pattern. Despite the centrality of some of those cases to
our constitutional jurisprudence, in most cases the Court fails to ask
questions or seek evidence that might be critical to ensuring the accuracy
of the prediction or determining whether a prediction is necessary at all.9

2473.pdf [https://perma.cc/LBP8-7QDU] (discussing the amenability of the President to criminal
prosecution while in office))).
8. For an insightful discussion of factual precedents, see Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (2013).
9. The Article’s focus on Supreme Court cases is not intended to imply that lower court predictions
are unimportant. Yet some of the practice’s consequences, such as the creation of factual precedents
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Part III uses that sample of cases to begin to describe and categorize the
various forms of predictive factfinding. For example, it examines how
some predictions are directly related to the doctrinal question at the center
of the case, while other ones—such as assertions that a certain result will
lead to a flood of litigation—bear less obvious relation to the issue
litigated by the parties.
Part IV builds on the previous Parts to explore the problems that
predictive factfinding creates. Judges’ predictions are often wrong and
usually lack precision, and these incorrect predictions may create factual
precedent, turning erroneous assumptions into law and sometimes
precluding any remedy. When judges make predictions in the absence of
adequate briefing from the parties, it weakens the adversarial system by
depriving litigants of a full opportunity to argue their case. And, as courtwatchers observe these shortcomings, the Court’s method of predictive
factfinding may hurt the judiciary’s legitimacy. Part V offers some initial
solutions to those problems, partially drawn from Washington v.
Glucksberg,10 a Supreme Court case about physician-assisted suicide.11 At
a high level, those solutions include looking more closely at predictive
factfinding and its effects and using already-existing tools, such as
remands, to ameliorate the problems predictive factfinding can create.
I.

LEGISLATIVE FACTS AND PREDICTIVE FACTS

A.

The Legislative Facts Debate and the Court’s Turn to Empirical
Evidence

Scholars and judges have long distinguished between two types of
facts: adjudicative facts and legislative facts.12 Adjudicative facts are
case-specific facts that a judge or jury might determine about a certain
litigant, such as whether a defendant knew that a gun was in her bag, the
date on which a plaintiff was diagnosed with lung cancer, or the length of
time police officers waited before breaking down a door to search a home.
Well-known evidentiary rules govern how trial courts should find such
facts and how appellate courts should review those findings: for example,
scientific evidence relating to adjudicative facts must meet the standard

and the limitation on future legislative experimentation, are especially acute when predictive facts are
found in Supreme Court opinions.
10. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
11. Id. at 702.
12. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942).

Ferguson (Do Not Delete)

1626

11/15/20 7:19 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1621

set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.13 And appellate
review of adjudicative facts is governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a)(6), which provides that “[f]indings of fact . . . must not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”14
Legislative facts, despite their name, are also found by courts.
However, they are generally broader in nature than adjudicative facts and
are more likely to affect multiple court cases. The Supreme Court
famously determined a legislative fact in Brown v. Board of Education15
when it found that segregation was psychologically harmful to minority
students.16 And for over forty years, the Court has based its campaign
finance jurisprudence on the legislative fact that an independent
expenditure is less beneficial to a candidate than a direct campaign
contribution.17 As Ann Woolhandler has described it, “such facts are used
to create law,” often because they are intended to “show[] the general
effect a legal rule will have.”18 Because legislative facts are not casespecific, the parties to any single case might not have special knowledge
of the legislative facts that will control the case’s outcome.
Often, especially in recent years, courts explicitly find legislative facts
based on data in the record. But dispositive findings of legislative fact are
implicit in many decisions as well: as David Faigman has noted, “Chief
Justice Marshall implicitly assumed [in Marbury v. Madison] that
legislators, though they swear to discharge their duties pursuant to the
Constitution, would not always remain faithful to that pledge, or at least
not as faithful as judges.”19 Even more basic and fundamental legislative
facts are also implicit in any court decision. For instance, a court deciding
whether to suppress certain evidence in a criminal case would implicitly
assume the legislative fact that police officers can see fewer details on an
unlit street at midnight than they can see in broad daylight. As these
examples show, broadly applicable facts are undisputedly vital in
judicial opinions.
Scholars’ increased recognition of the centrality of legislative
factfinding has led to vigorous debate in recent decades. The judiciary has

13. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. Id. at 494–95.
17. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
18. Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV.
111, 114 (1988).
19. David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 557 (1991) (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting)).
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been praised of late for embracing an empirical pragmatism to some
extent—rather than reaching conclusions of legislative fact “through
reason and intuition alone,”20 courts have become more willing to consult
empirical data and therefore less likely to make unsupported assumptions
about the world. As Seth Stoughton has explained it, “now more than ever,
litigants and courts rely on empirical information to support arguments
and justify opinions.”21
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has come under heavy criticism
because it has not yet developed a uniform process for determining
legislative facts, and no standards have been put in place to control the
quality of evidence supporting them.22 For example, the normal
evidentiary standard for trial courts’ acceptance of scientific evidence,
explicated in Daubert, does not apply to legislative facts.23 Thus, if a trial
court seeks to determine a question of legislative fact, it has several
options: it can hear expert testimony, rely on research included in party
briefs, perform its own research,24 rely on legal precedent, or use some
combination of these and other tools.25
On appeal, there is even more uncertainty about proper procedure.26

20. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Daubert and the Reference Manual: An Essay on the Future
of Science in Law, 82 VA. L. REV. 837, 848 (1996).
21. Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 854 (2014); see also Larsen, supra
note 8, at 61 (“The Supreme Court is in the ‘throes of a widespread empirical turn’; consequently, its
opinions are chock-full of statistics, social science studies, and other general statements of fact about
the world.” (quoting Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 118 (2003))); Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the
Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedure—and Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851,
853–54 (noting documented rise in citations to nonlegal, empirical sources). Legislative facts are still
sometimes unsupported by empirical backing. For example, “[f]ederalism is repeatedly championed
on the basis of empirical claims such as the value of states as laboratories of experimentation.” DAVID
L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 91 (2008).
22. See FAIGMAN, supra note 21, at 98 (“Historically, there has been no practice or tradition that
reviewable facts be introduced at trial and survive the rigors of the adversarial process.”); see also
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548 (1924) ( “[T]he court may ascertain as it sees fit any
fact that is merely a ground for laying down a rule of law . . . .”).
23. See Rachel F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on Race, Social Science, and
the Law, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515, 533 (2010) (“Daubert does not reach evidence on legislative
facts, which judges are free to admit at their discretion.”).
24. Commentators disagree on whether judges should perform independent research. See generally
Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263 (2007)
(promoting broader use of independent judicial research).
25. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (2013) (stating that district judges generally follow rules of evidence and
civil procedure when determining legislative facts but noting that facts can be introduced in other
ways).
26. See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61
DUKE L.J. 1, 45 (2011).
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Federal appellate courts need not defer to trial courts’ findings of
legislative fact,27 and they may decide to answer legislative fact questions
without consulting the record, perhaps because the question was not
litigated below.28 The parties or amici might brief the issue, but there is
no guarantee that litigants will be aware that the case will turn on a certain
question of legislative fact.29 Kenneth Culp Davis, who coined the term
“legislative fact,” lamented that when “deliberating about a case [and
realizing] that it needs legislative facts it does not have,” the Court has no
system or rules about how it should respond.30 Professor Davis identified
seven options the Court has used, which include remanding the case for
further factfinding (which rarely occurs), baldly asserting facts without
support, and examining published sources outside the record.31 Yet the
Court has failed to provide any coherent reasoning about how it decides
which path to take.32
This unencumbered and unpredictable process likely exacerbates other
problems with legislative factfinding. For example, judges usually lack
training in interpreting data; while it is better to consult data than fabricate
facts, courts faced with competing studies or experts may fail to recognize
prevailing scientific opinion.33 And the Supreme Court has not
consistently allocated burdens of evidentiary proof in its constitutional
decisions within the various tiers of scrutiny. Thus, in a case applying
rational basis review, the Court might strike down a law because the state

27. Borgmann, supra note 25, at 1185 (challenging the “common assumption” that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), which provides for a “clearly erroneous” standard of review, does not apply
to legislative facts).
28. See Gorod, supra note 26, at 29–30 (discussing extra-record factfinding in Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
29. See Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1762, 1800–02
(2014) (“Less than a third of the factual claims [in amicus briefs] credited by the Court were contested
by the party briefs.”).
30. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed
Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986).
31. The other options Davis identified are (1) taking judicial notice of “common experience”;
(2) “examin[ing] a published source and [finding] what is not there”; (3) ignoring the factual question
at issue; and (4) putting the burden of proof on one of the parties. Id. at 9–11. In response to this
problem, Davis repeatedly suggested improving the Court’s institutional ability to find facts by
creating a nonpartisan expert research agency to assist the Court. Id. at 8–9; see also Jeffrey M.
Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by the Supreme Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REV.
236, 237 (1983) (“Throughout its history, the Court has devoted little attention to developing proper
methodology to deal with constitutional facts.”).
32. Davis, supra note 30, at 9–11.
33. See FAIGMAN, supra note 21, at 73 (“The Court . . . displayed a stunning lack of understanding
of basic statistical methods in Barefoot v. Estelle.”); Meares, supra note 21, at 854 (“[C]ourts are not
capable of dealing with complicated, and sometimes conflicting, social science data. Judges are not
trained to assess empirical studies, and so they may unwittingly create bad decisions.”).
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has not provided proof of its necessity.34 In the next case, the Court might
apply strict scrutiny but uphold the law because the challengers did not
provide sufficient evidence calling the law’s effectiveness into question.35
Further, scholars have identified precedent that is nominally based on a
legislative fact, but when new research or technology shows that the fact
has changed or was never true to begin with, the Court nevertheless
adheres to precedent.36 These inconsistencies indicate that the Court
sometimes picks and chooses data or decisional rules that support a
preconceived outcome, leading some to contend that legislative facts are
simply used as window dressing.37
Of course, most of these ongoing problems only occur because of a
positive development—the Court recognizes the importance of legislative
facts and thus, in most instances, feels obligated to confront and
analyze them.
B.

Predictive Legislative Facts

Although some have recognized that legislative facts can be
predictive,38 neither scholars nor courts have explored the nature of
predictive legislative factfinding as a phenomenon separate from other
legislative factfinding.39 Predictive legislative facts seek to describe the
world not as it is today, but as the predictor believes it will be in the future
(or would be under some counterfactual scenario).40 For example, a court
finds a predictive fact when it forecasts that a certain statute forbidding
bribery would dissuade elected officials from interacting with constituents
for fear of being prosecuted. Likewise, a court may predict that a broader
34. FAIGMAN, supra note 21, at 101–02 (contrasting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
473 U.S. 432 (1985), and Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)); David Parker, Note, Policing
Procedure Before Substance: Reforming Judicial Review of the Factual Predicates to Legislation, 99
VA. L. REV. 1327, 1327–28 (2013).
35. See FAIGMAN, supra note 21, at 101–02.
36. See id. at 53–56 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and progeny).
37. See Borgmann, supra note 25, at 1196–97 (arguing that in Brown and Roe, “the social science
‘evidence’ likely did not influence the establishment of constitutional doctrine but instead served as
neutral-sounding cover for justices acutely aware of wading into a contentious social debate”); Moran,
supra note 23, at 524 (discussing critics’ view that judges “make limited use of [empirical] evidence,
primarily as a convenient post hoc justification for the results they desire”).
38. See Gorod, supra note 26, at 39; Dean M. Hashimoto, Science As Mythology in Constitutional
Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 111, 130 (1997) (“When the Court uses legislative facts, they are offered as
predictions about the effects of legal rules and are inherently disputable.”).
39. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV.
281, 299 (2000) (“The Supreme Court has tended not to distinguish predictive harms from other kinds
of harms, and indeed other kinds of legislative findings.”).
40. For brevity, in this Article I generally refer to predictive legislative facts as “predictive facts.”
In other contexts, the term could be used to describe predictive adjudicative facts as well.
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application of the exclusionary rule would lead to a flood of litigation. As
explained more thoroughly below, this kind of predictive factfinding is
prevalent at the Supreme Court and allows the Court to declare facts
without providing the empirical support expected when a typical
legislative fact is declared. Such forecasting creates a set of concerns
overlapping with but distinct from those associated with legislative
factfinding in general.
1.

A Working Definition of Predictive Legislative Facts

As the name implies, predictive legislative facts are forecasts about
general questions, such as whether a more defendant-friendly
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment will lead to an increase in crime.
Of course, such predictions are not strictly “facts” at all—they are
predictions that a factual scenario will occur under certain circumstances.
Yet this Article refers to these predictions as predictive facts because, as
the remainder of this Article will demonstrate, the Court has used such
predictions to replace standard findings of legislative fact.41 For example,
if a case presents the Fourth Amendment question mentioned above, the
Court would normally be expected to review evidence to determine how
a limit on police activity—such as the rule that evidence must be excluded
if police fail to knock and announce their presence before entering a
home—generally affects conviction or crime rates. In some
circumstances, however, the Court will not review any evidence and
instead will simply predict the outcome of a certain rule. While the Court
could engage in the same type of research when finding a predictive fact
as it does when finding a legislative fact (such as reviewing studies or
surveying the experience of states or lower courts), it rarely does so.42
In defining the scope of predictive facts, it is important to recognize the
distinctions between predictions of legislative fact and predictions of
adjudicative fact. Predictions of adjudicative fact are case specific, do not
directly create new legal rules, and happen all the time in trial courts.43 A
criminal court judge must decide whether to release a defendant on bail
before trial, and that decision will hinge in part on a prediction of whether

41. The Court sometimes makes other broad predictions that do not serve as a stand-in for
legislative facts. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 798–801 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (predicting that the Court would strike down same-sex marriage bans). Using the term
“predictive facts” is intended to distinguish general predictions from those that operate as legislative
facts.
42. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006); McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. __,
136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372–74 (2016).
43. See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 18, at 113–16 (discussing how courts regularly deal in
adjudicative facts).
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that defendant will return to court.44 Likewise, trial courts must determine
whether to grant temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions
based on assessments of future harm. While such predictions are a vital
part of the justice system, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
It is just as critical to distinguish between predictive legislative
factfinding and regular (non-predictive) legislative factfinding, though the
line between the two is sometimes blurry. Naturally, the principal and
most obvious difference is whether a court identifies a supposedly extant
fact (thus identifying a traditional legislative fact) or asserts that
something will happen in the future if a certain event occurs (thus
identifying a predictive legislative fact): either corporate campaign
spending does not lead to corruption or, if corporate campaign spending
is allowed in the future, it will not lead to corruption.45 In each case, the
court draws a conclusion about the future effect of a rule, so in both
situations it is making at least an inherent prediction.46 The difference is
that in the case of non-predictive factfinding, the court claims that a
certain phenomenon already exists, and the court is simply identifying it;
in the case of predictive factfinding, the court does not claim that the
phenomenon exists, but prophesies that it will exist under certain
circumstances. Thus, as the campaign spending example illustrates, the
difference between regular legislative factfinding and predictive
factfinding may be based on whether a judge believes that there is existing
support for making a broad factual claim; if there is, a regular legislative
fact may be declared. If not, the court might make a prediction.47
This decision—whether to state a legislative fact or make a
prediction—lies at the root of many cases and can have significant
consequences. As noted, the Supreme Court is now relatively likely to
provide empirical support when it finds legislative facts.48 For example,
at this stage it would be quite surprising (but not unheard of) to see the
Court review a case about whether violent video games are harmful to
44. Scholars have studied how judges perform on such predictions of adjudicative fact. See Jon
Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil Mullainathan, Human
Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 237, 241–43 (2018).
45. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
46. See Woolhandler, supra note 18, at 115 (noting that legislative facts can be “defined as
predictions about the effects of legal rules”).
47. Creating even more complexity, on occasion the Court’s language straddles the border between
prediction and description. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court invalidated a limit on independent
expenditures in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), stating that the expenditures “may well
provide little assistance” to a candidate, and “may prove counterproductive.” 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
That wording does not clarify whether the Court was attempting to describe a current phenomenon or
predict the future; while independent campaign spending existed on a relatively minor level before
FECA was passed, it is not clear that the Court’s assessment was based on such spending.
48. See Larsen, supra note 8, at 61.
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children without either relying on empirical support for its conclusion or
faulting one party for its failure to provide sufficient data.49 But as
demonstrated in Part II, when engaging in predictive factfinding, the same
pressure to provide data appears not to exist: if an event has not yet
occurred, there is no data on the effects of that event, and a predicting
judge could plausibly claim that the case requires her to make a best guess
about the effects of a law even if there is no hard support for that
conclusion. While that claim is undoubtedly correct in some
circumstances, the latter Parts of this Article describe the problems such
predictions may create and how those problems can be minimized.
2.

The Limited Attention to Predictive Factfinding

In many contexts, the law recognizes the difficulty of predicting
outcomes. First, the Supreme Court itself is wary of making predictions
in some circumstances, and it has sporadically recognized its own
comparative disadvantage at that endeavor. In Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I),50 the Court reviewed a congressional
prediction that cable companies’ increasing dominance would threaten the
existence of free broadcast television.51 The Court reiterated that it “must
accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress,”
because “Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary” to evaluate
complex data and use it “to anticipate the likely impact” of future events.52
Other legal doctrines, such as the business judgment rule, apply a similar
level of deference to defendants’ actions, recognizing that non-judicial
decisionmakers trying to estimate how future events will unfold have a
difficult task.53
Moreover, within certain doctrinal frameworks the Supreme Court has
explicitly acknowledged that relying on unsupported predictions is
dangerous. For example, the Court has held that certain types of facial
challenges—those that are brought before a statute has been implemented,
creating “ripeness-related concerns”54—are disfavored because they
“often rest on speculation” and therefore ask a court to prematurely

49. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
50. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
51. Id. at 665–68.
52. Id. at 665.
53. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571, 574 (1998) (describing how business judgment rule protects corporate officers from
hindsight bias).
54. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 960
(2011).
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determine how a law will operate before there is much of a record.55 And
by facially striking down a law through speculation, the Court may
unnecessarily “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”56 The Court has
also acknowledged that First Amendment overbreadth cases essentially
involve “judicial prediction[s] or assumption[s]” that statutes “cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression.”57 Because the doctrine is based on such
predictions, facial invalidation of a statute on overbreadth grounds “has
been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort”—“there
comes a point where . . . a prediction . . . cannot, with confidence, justify
invalidating a statute on its face.”58
Despite exercising caution when it comes to predictive factfinding in
certain circumstances, the Court has not meaningfully addressed the
dangers of predictive factfinding more generally, even if justices have
sporadically questioned “how good [the] Court is about predicting the
consequences of some of [its] decisions.”59 Moreover, commentators have
for the most part discussed predictions only when criticizing individual
decisions. If a Supreme Court forecast turns out to be badly wrong,
especially in a controversial case, opponents of the Court’s decision will
be loath to let the mistake go unnoticed.60 And in contexts outside the
debate about legislative factfinding, scholars have acknowledged the
Supreme Court’s predictions and have sometimes suggested remedies.
Michael Dorf has recognized “the Court’s limited ability to evaluate
empirical and predictive claims,” focusing on Clinton v. Jones61 and
Morrison v. Olson,62 two cases in which the Court attempted to discern

55. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008); see also
Catherine Gage O’Grady, The Role of Speculation in Facial Challenges, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 867, 881
(2011) (examining “pure” facial challenge cases and stating that in such cases, the “decision-maker
must accept hypothetical theories about human behavior that the statute’s challengers suggest would
likely be triggered by the operation of the challenged statute”).
56. Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450 (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
346–47 (1936)).
57. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
58. Id. at 613, 615.
59. Trump v. Vance Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 97 (Alito, J.).
60. For example, after the dissent in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009),
predicted that the decision would lead to a flood of judicial recusal motions, the error was welldocumented. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Supreme Court, Judicial Elections, and Dark Money,
67 DEPAUL L. REV. 281, 297 (2018) (pointing out that the flood of recusal motions predicted by the
Caperton dissent has failed to materialize).
61. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
62. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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how its decision would affect the executive branch.63 In response to the
problem, Professor Dorf proposed a system of “provisional adjudication,”
discussed more in Part V, under which the Court could reach a conclusion
but later revisit that decision with the benefit of experience showing
whether the Court’s prediction was correct.64
Despite this awareness of predictions both from the Court and scholars,
the robust discussion of legislative facts has mostly failed to address the
distinctions between predictive legislative facts and regular legislative
facts. The remainder of this Article looks at predictive factfinding broadly,
as a general tool for deciding cases. Most of the cases reviewed are
constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court in which the Court
forecasts how a statute, a rule, or its own decision would affect interests
important to the outcome of the case. The Article builds on the research
discussed above and begins to study the nature of predictive facts, explore
their prevalence and import, and consider ways to ameliorate the problems
they create.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT’S PREDICTIVE JURISPRUDENCE

Part II examines several Supreme Court predictions in order to
demonstrate how the Court uses predictive phrasing to make factual
pronouncements without acknowledging a lack of reliance on empirical
evidence. As explained more in Part V, my criticism of the Court’s
jurisprudence should not be taken as a call for elimination of predictive
factfinding, foremost because predictions are inevitable and often
advisable. Rather, this Part looks at how the Court has used predictive
factfinding as a stand-in for legislative factfinding in order to make
evidence-free claims. This Part also points out questions the Court failed
to ask when reaching its conclusions.
In McDonnell v. United States,65 the Supreme Court unanimously
reversed the corruption convictions of former Virginia Governor Bob
McDonnell.66 McDonnell had been convicted of honest services fraud for
accepting about $175,000 worth of money and gifts in exchange for
performing favors for a Virginia businessman, Jonnie Williams.67
Williams’s company produced a dietary pill made from tobacco.68
63. Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 75
(1998).
64. Id. at 9, 60–69.
65. 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
66. Id. at 2375.
67. Id. at 2361.
68. Id. at 2362.

Ferguson (Do Not Delete)

2020]

11/15/20 7:19 PM

PREDICTIVE FACTS

1635

Evidence at trial showed that McDonnell held events promoting the pill
and told the head of the state’s health insurance plan that the pill was
working well for him and would be good for state employees. McDonnell
was convicted under a federal statute that prohibited government officials
from accepting a thing of value in exchange for “being ‘influenced in the
performance of any official act.’”69
The first part of the Court’s opinion reversing McDonnell’s conviction
was purely focused on statutory interpretation and concluded that “setting
up a meeting, calling another public official, or hosting an event does not,
standing alone, qualify as an ‘official act.’”70 Because the trial court had
not limited the definition of “official act” in its jury instructions,
McDonnell’s conviction could not stand.
The opinion could have ended there, but the Court went on to explain
that a broader reading of “‘official act’ would raise significant
constitutional concerns.”71 That was because anything a government
official accepted from a constituent, such as a contribution or a free lunch,
could count as a quid in a quid pro quo deal.72 If the quo was simply setting
up a meeting, dire consequences could result, because “conscientious
public officials arrange meetings for constituents . . . all the time.”73 A
broad corruption law “could cast a pall of potential prosecution” over
elected officials, and they “might wonder whether they could respond to
even the most commonplace requests for assistance.”74 Regular citizens
“might shrink from participating in democratic discourse.”75
The citations in the Court’s opinion revealed that its concern over
elected officials’ freedom was not manufactured by the justices
themselves, but was taken from three amicus briefs submitted on behalf
of former federal and state officials, none of which cited empirical
evidence.76 And while that concern should be taken seriously and might

69. Id. at 2365 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3)).
70. Id. at 2368.
71. Id. at 2372; see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Passive Avoidance, 71 STAN. L. REV. 513, 556–57
(2019) (noting that McDonnell discussed constitutional concerns “almost as an afterthought” and “as
a secondary justification” for its reading of the text).
72. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (first citing Brief for Former Fed. Offs. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6,
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474); then citing Brief for Former Va. Att’ys Gen. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–2, 16, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474); and then citing
Brief for 77 Former State Att’ys Gen. (Non–Virginia) as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner Robert
F. McDonnell at 1–2, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474)). All three briefs relied principally
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even be dispositive, the Court’s approach to its prediction is instructive.
The Court did not (at least explicitly) perform or refer to any research on
questions that could have informed its prediction. Most obviously, the
Court did not ask whether there had been any federal prosecutions for the
types of innocuous actions listed in the opinion, how long federal
prosecutors had used the unacceptably broad definition of “official act,”
or whether that definition had been accepted by appellate courts.77 The
Court therefore had no way to determine whether officials subject to that
definition had hesitated before responding to constituent requests or if
constituents had been led to “shrink from participating in democratic
discourse.”78 Also unexamined was whether there were state laws that had
previously used the same broad definition of “official act” that had led to
the Court’s feared results, and if so, how many people that
definition affected.
If the Court had sought to answer any of those questions, it would have
presumably needed to ask whether any damage caused by the expansive
definition would have been outweighed by the benefits of reduced
corruption.79 And though the Court’s holding on the constitutionality of
the statute is unclear, it is most likely the last word on any similar state
statute, meaning that no broad interpretation of “official act” will be
sanctioned unless the Court revisits its holding.80
The McDonnell opinion was surprising because it was unanimous, not
because it contained an unsupported predictive fact. In sharply divided

on case law, and one listed examples of government officials explicitly offering access in exchange
for donations. See Brief for Former Fed. Offs. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, 19–20,
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474).
77. The Court may not have found all of that information even if it had searched. As discussed in
more detail in Part V, there are better solutions to the problem than declaring an unsupported
predictive fact. See infra Part V. Aside from avoiding making predictions in dicta, the Court could
remand the case, adopt a provisional ruling, or, more generally, create decisional rules clarifying
which party has the burden to prove or disprove questions of predictive fact.
78. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372. For a list of questions courts should ask when reviewing the
constitutionality of a statute and the necessity of finding legislative facts when answering those
questions, see Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 666 (1988) (quoting Kenneth Karst, Legislative Facts
in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 84 (1960)).
79. See FAIGMAN, supra note 21, at 68–69 (discussing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987), and arguing that if government’s test for pretrial detention could “identif[y] forty percent of
those who would be violent if released,” the Court should explicitly discuss whether that “outweigh[s]
the individual’s liberty interest”).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x 733, 736–37 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that court
was “obliged to identify error” in jury instructions because of McDonnell’s conclusion that
instructions “raise[d] ‘significant constitutional concerns’”); Nelson v. United States, No. 3:16-cv1434-J-32JBT, 2019 WL 1763226, at *4 n.10 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2019) (explaining that definition
of “official acts” was “cabined by the constitutional concerns identified in McDonnell”).
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cases, the majority and dissent often bitterly dispute predictive facts,
usually without relying on much evidence. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co.,81 for example, the five-justice majority held that in “extreme”
circumstances, the Due Process Clause requires a judge to recuse from a
case if it involves a litigant who provided significant financial support to
the judge’s campaign.82 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court focused
principally on the facts of the case and the difficulty of proving actual
bias, but it also concluded that the decision would not cause “a flood of
recusal motions” because “[t]he parties [had] point[ed] to no other
instance involving judicial campaign contributions that present[ed] a
potential for bias comparable to the” case at bar.83 The Court also noted
that past recusal decisions had not led to floods of litigation.84
In contrast to the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent was
centered around predictions about the decision’s consequences for the
judicial system. The opening portion of the opinion surmised that the new
rule would “inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are
biased, however groundless those charges may be. The end result will do
far more to erode public confidence in judicial impartiality than an
isolated failure to recuse in a particular case.”85 The dissent then
characterized the majority’s assertion that the case would not lead to a
flood of litigation as “so much whistling past the graveyard.”86 In the
dissenters’ view, each claim of judicial bias would “bring[] the judge and
the judicial system into disrepute,” with “all future litigants [asserting]
that their case is really the most extreme thus far.”87
Unlike the McDonnell Court, the dissenting justices in Caperton did
attempt to support their claim to a limited degree—the opinion discussed
a 1989 case, United States v. Halper,88 which applied the Double Jeopardy
clause to civil cases.89 Though the Halper Court said that its rule would

81. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
82. Id. at 886.
83. Id. at 887. Litigants now often try to persuade the Court that a certain decision would lead to a
flood of litigation. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S.
__, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (No. 18-422) (attorney for appellants arguing that “if you get in the
business of adjudicating these cases, these cases will come, they will come in large numbers. And
once you get into the political thicket, you will not get out and you will tarnish the image of this
Court”). In Rucho, the Court accepted that argument. See 139 S. Ct. at 2507.
84. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 888.
85. Id. at 891 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 899.
87. Id.
88. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
89. Id. at 448–49.
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only apply to “the rare case,”90 claims based on Halper “turned out not to
be so ‘rare’ after all,” and the Court abandoned the rule eight years later.91
Though the Caperton dissent said that “[t]he déjà vu is enough to make
one swoon,” it did not explain why Caperton and Halper were
analogous.92 Nor did it purport to examine whether other “rare case”
predictions had been correct. Neither the majority nor the dissent looked
at whether any states had already adopted Caperton-type rules, and if so,
whether they suffered from a sharp increase in recusal motions that had
brought “the judicial system into disrepute.”93 Nor did the dissent explain
how many Caperton claims would render the rule intolerable under the
proposed standard or weigh that number of claims against the due process
rights of a litigant whose judge may be biased because
of political spending.
The most perplexing passage of the Caperton dissent was the last
paragraph. After opening the opinion by stating that the decision would
“inevitably” lead to an increase in recusal motions that would “erode
public confidence,” the opinion ended with resignation and uncertainty:
“I believe that opening the door to recusal claims . . . will itself bring our
judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and diminish” Americans’
confidence in the courts.94 But, the Chief Justice concluded, “I hope I
am wrong.”95
He was wrong. The accuracy of the main prediction in Caperton, unlike
many others discussed here, could be measured with precision several
years later by simply counting the number of subsequent recusal motions.
Bradley Smith, a prominent supporter of Chief Justice Roberts’s Caperton
dissent conceded the point succinctly: “[D]id the floodgates open? No!”96
90. Id. at 449.
91. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 900 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 899. In at least two cases, the Court’s majority has responded to the dissent’s “flood of
litigation” concern with reference to the experience of states or lower courts. See Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 328 (2009) (“Given these strategic considerations, and in light of the
experience in those States that already provide the same or similar protections to defendants, there is
little reason to believe that our decision today will commence the parade of horribles respondent and
the dissent predict.”); see also Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 (2011) (rejecting floodgates
argument because in the circuit courts there had been no “litigation flood or even rainfall”).
94. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 891, 902 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 902.
96. N.Y.U. Sch. of L., Courts, Campaigns, and Corruption: Judicial Recusal Five Years After
Caperton, Panel 1: Caperton and the Courts: Did the Floodgates Open?, YOUTUBE (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xt4pqd5iAGw (comments of Bradley Smith at 33:00); see also
Adam Liptak, Keith Swisher, James Sample & Bradley A. Smith, Caperton and the Courts: Did the
Floodgates Open?, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 491 (2015) (transcript of the panel);
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And just a few months after that assessment was made, the same issue
arose in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar.97 There, the plaintiff challenged a
Florida rule barring judicial candidates from directly soliciting campaign
contributions, which was intended to preserve public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary. This time, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the
five-justice majority that upheld the restriction. Williams-Yulee conceded
that face-to-face solicitation could “create[] a problem,” but she argued
that a request made by phone or text message would not raise any
corruption concern.98 The majority refused to “wade into th[e] swamp” of
predicting the effects of such rules, because the state was not obligated to
perfectly tailor its regulations.99 However, when the plaintiff suggested
that the rule was unnecessary because the state’s goal could be achieved
through judicial recusal rules and campaign contribution limits, the
majority cited the Caperton dissent to conclude that such rules would
cause “a flood of postelection recusal motions [that] could ‘erode public
confidence in judicial impartiality.’”100 Further, a rule requiring recusal in
every case involving a campaign contribution “would disable
many jurisdictions.”101
The Williams-Yulee majority made even less of an effort than the
Caperton dissenters to support its findings of predictive fact. While the
Caperton dissent discussed Halper, the Williams-Yulee majority relied
solely on the dissenting opinion’s prediction made in Caperton six years
prior.102 By that time, the Court could have asked whether the Caperton
flood of litigation had occurred. It could have also asked the type of
questions that were unanswered by the Caperton opinions: whether there
were states with the recusal rules proposed by the plaintiff, whether any
states that had such a rule saw a flood of post-election recusal motions,

Briffault, supra note 60, at 297 (“Although Chief Justice Roberts viewed with alarm ‘the inherently
boundless nature’ of Caperton’s ‘rule’ and predicted that the courts would soon be ‘forced to deal
with a wide variety of Caperton motions,’ it appears that few such motions have followed and the
case has had little direct impact on the recusal of elected judges.” (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 899–
900 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting))).
97. 575 U.S. 433 (2015).
98. Id. at 454.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 455 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 891 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
101. Id. The Court also worried that a recusal rule “could create a perverse incentive for litigants
to make campaign contributions to judges solely as a means to trigger their later recusal—a form of
peremptory strike against a judge that would enable transparent forum shopping.” Id.
102. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were part of the majority in both Caperton and in WilliamsYulee, calling into question whether they agreed with the predictions made in the latter case.
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and whether any such jurisdictions had been “disable[d]” by such a rule.103
The inaccuracy of the prediction made by the Caperton dissent and
reissued by the Williams-Yulee majority is troubling on its own because
such predictions often govern large swaths of American jurisprudence.
But perhaps more remarkable is the Caperton dissent’s recognition that
the accuracy of its prediction was in real doubt. It is hard to imagine any
member of the Court basing an opinion on a regular legislative fact that is
both so uncertain and so unsupported by evidence unless there were no
other ways to decide the case. Yet in Caperton, rather than study the issue
further or ask how certain one should be before basing an opinion on a
finding of predictive fact, the dissenting justices sought to implement a
rule that would foreclose a whole class of constitutional claims because
of a “belie[f]” that it could lead to undesirable consequences.104 Then,
when six years had passed and there was a strong reason to believe that
the prediction was incorrect, the majority in Williams-Yulee relied on it
once more.
The Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence has relied on predictive
factfinding as well. In Hudson v. Michigan,105 the Court decided whether
to apply the exclusionary rule to violations of the “knock-and-announce”
requirement, which holds that police officers executing a search warrant
must knock and wait a reasonable amount of time before forcibly entering
a home.106 The Court declined to suppress the evidence at issue, reasoning
that applying the exclusionary rule would lead police to wait longer than
they needed to before entering homes, “producing preventable violence
against officers in some cases, and the destruction of evidence in many
others.”107 Further, allowing suppression claims “would generate a
constant flood of alleged failures to observe the rule” and “[c]ourts would
experience as never before” that the exclusionary rule would require
extensive litigation.108 As with the cases discussed above, the Court did
not cite evidence to support its predictions. Nor did it acknowledge that
states such as Florida, Colorado, and New Mexico had long applied the
exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations based on state law
103. Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 455. Justice Scalia’s dissent did not respond to the majority’s
predictions about the problems with recusal rules. He did fault the majority for making the “happy
forecast” that banning requests for contributions would improve public trust in judges without
“identif[ying] the slightest evidence” in support. Id. at 466–67 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 902 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
105. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
106. Id. at 588–89.
107. Id. at 595.
108. Id.; see also John D. Castiglione, Hudson and Samson: The Roberts Court Confronts Privacy,
Dignity, and the Fourth Amendment, 68 LA. L. REV. 63, 96 (2007) (disputing the Court’s prediction
that enforcement of exclusionary rule would lead to a flood of litigation).
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grounds,109 let alone ask whether those jurisdictions had faced the
problems predicted.110
While the Court has, on rare occasions, more fully considered its
predictive jurisprudence,111 cases like McDonnell, Caperton, WilliamsYulee, and Hudson typify the Court’s recent treatment of predictive facts.
Countless cases follow the same pattern. For instance, in California
Democratic Party v. Jones,112 the Court invalidated California’s blanket
primary system.113 Under that system, all primary voters received the
same ballot and could vote for any candidate, regardless of party;
however, the top vote-getter from each party nevertheless became that
party’s nominee in the general election.114 The Court struck down the law
based largely on the prediction that “a single election in which the party
nominee is selected by nonparty members could be enough to destroy the
party,” or at least “severely transform it.”115 Eight years later, in
109. See People v. Lujan, 484 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Colo. 1971); Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706,
711 (Fla. 1964); State v. Jean-Paul, 295 P.3d 1072, 1076–77 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that 1994
New Mexico Supreme Court case “states that suppression is the appropriate remedy under Article II,
Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution for the failure to follow the knock-and-announce rule”);
see also State v. Cable, 51 So. 3d 434, 435 (Fla. 2010) (noting that in Benefield the Court “held that
a violation of Florida’s knock-and-announce statute vitiated the ensuing arrest and required the
suppression of the evidence obtained in connection with the arrest”); Castiglione, supra note 108, at
96 (“Given that, until Hudson, it had been assumed by most courts that an exclusionary remedy
existed for knock-and-announce violations, and given that the criminal courts have not been suffering
from a deluge of knock-and-announce suppression motions, Justice Scalia is clearly overstating the
threat to judicial economy posed by allowing exclusion.”).
110. Other criminal procedure decisions rest on predictive facts as well. See United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Moreover, a constitutional rule
permitting felony arrests only with a warrant or in exigent circumstances could severely hamper
effective law enforcement.”). In Apodaca v. Oregon, the Court declined to extend the Sixth
Amendment jury unanimity requirement to the states. 406 U.S. 404 (1972). The defendants argued
that unanimity was necessary in order to enforce the rule that juries represent a cross-section of the
community. Id. at 413. The plurality rejected that argument, predicting that even in states without the
unanimity requirement, minority jurors’ “views [would] be heard.” Id. The plurality also refused to
“assume . . . that a majority [would] deprive a man of his liberty on the basis of prejudice when a
minority is presenting a reasonable argument in favor of acquittal.” Id. Subsequent studies have called
those predictions into question, and the Court overruled Apodaca in Ramos v. Louisiana. 590 U.S.
__, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020). At least one brief in support of the defendant in Ramos cited empirical
data to argue that Apodaca’s prediction was incorrect. See, e.g., Brief for L. Professors & Soc.
Scientists as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (No. 18-5924).
111. See infra Part V.
112. 530 U.S. 567 (2000). The Court did not address whether the challenge to California’s law was
facial.
113. Id. at 577.
114. Id. at 570–71.
115. Id. at 579. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties,
Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 312 (2001) (noting
“the limited empirical evidence of fundamental incapacitation of parties in the California blanket
primary experiment”).
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Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,116 the
Court predicted that voters would not be confused by ballots that listed a
candidate’s “party preference,” even though that candidate would not
necessarily be endorsed by her preferred party.117 The majority first noted
that the challengers’ argument was “disfavored” since it was a facial
challenge.118 Recognizing that the challengers had a high burden to meet,
the Court called the voter-confusion concern “sheer speculation” and
rejected it.119 The Court also explained that its precedent “reflect[ed] a
greater faith in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves about
campaign issues.”120
Just over ten years earlier, in Clinton v. Jones, the Court decided
whether “the Constitution requires federal courts to defer” civil suits
against the President until the end of his term.121 President Clinton
asserted that allowing Paula Jones’s lawsuit to continue would “hamper
the performance of his official duties.”122 The Court rejected that
argument, concluding that “if the past is any indicator, it seems unlikely
that a deluge of such litigation will ever engulf the Presidency. As for the
case at hand, if properly managed by the District Court, it appears to us
highly unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of petitioner’s time.”123
That prediction has already been relied upon in Trump v. Vance, a case in
which the Supreme Court decided that the President does not have
absolute immunity that would allow him to refuse to comply with a state
prosecutor’s grand jury subpoena seeking his tax returns.124
The Court’s common practice of predictive factfinding did not begin in
the past couple of decades. In 1974, the justices decided Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, which invalidated a state law requiring
116. 552 U.S. 442 (2008).
117. Id. at 444.
118. Id. at 450.
119. Id. at 454.
120. Id. The Chief Justice, concurring, wrote that certain ballot designs would have been
permissible, but that others would not survive a First Amendment challenge. Id. at 459–62 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
121. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997).
122. Id. at 701.
123. Id. at 702. That forecast was later heavily criticized. See, e.g., Andrew J. Wistrich, The
Evolving Temporality of Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 737, 826 n.354 (2012) (calling the prediction
in Clinton v. Jones “embarrassingly poor”).
124. Trump v. Vance, 591 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2420–21, 2426 (2020); see also Brief in
Opposition on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Trump, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 19-635) (“[T]his Court has rejected the contention that
subjecting a sitting President to judicial process necessarily ‘impose[s] an unacceptable burden on the
President’s time and energy, and thereby impair[s] the effective performance of his office.’” (quoting
Clinton, 520 U.S. at 702)).
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newspapers to provide political candidates with space to reply to
criticism.125 The majority opinion stated that because of the potential
penalties, newspaper editors “might well conclude that the safe course is
to avoid controversy,” and “political and electoral coverage would be
blunted or reduced.”126 Though the Court acknowledged that the statute
in question was enacted in 1913, it did not ask whether, in the sixty years
before the decision, there was any indication that Florida newspapers had
avoided political controversy, leading to “blunted” electoral coverage.
And significantly, at the end of the opinion the Court concluded that even
if the law did not lead to increased costs or lead editors to “forgo
publication of news or opinion,” it was unconstitutional anyway “because
of its intrusion into the function of editors.”127
This Part has not attempted to exhaustively document significant
Supreme Court cases that have relied on predictive factfinding. There are
many additional examples, including both high-profile and less significant
cases involving constitutional rights,128 agency adjudication and
rulemaking,129 and more.130 But these cases provide examples of how the
Court has made predictions, demonstrate that the practice is at least
somewhat prevalent, and raise some questions about what the Court has
left unsaid. Part III will refer to these cases in an attempt to better
understand the nature of predictive factfinding.
III. DESCRIBING AND CATEGORIZING PREDICTIVE
FACTFINDING
This Part identifies discrete categories of predictive facts, such as
predictions about legislative actions versus predictions about court-made
125. Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
126. Id. at 257.
127. Id. at 258.
128. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 679 (2015) (predicting that recognition of samesex marriages would not lead to decrease in opposite-sex marriages); Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (predicting that that the appearance of influence or access caused by unlimited
corporate spending in elections would “not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy”);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (predicting that “[t]he views expressed
by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition . . . will not
likely be identified with those of the owner” of a shopping center).
129. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 618 (2013) (disagreeing with
“dissent’s forecast” that decision would “depriv[e] local governments of the ability to charge
reasonable permitting fees”); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641 n.17 (1987) (upholding
state agency’s affirmative action plan and discussing dissent’s prediction that the decision would
“loose a flood of ‘less qualified’ minorities and women upon the work force”).
130. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 735, 747 (2020) (refusing to allow Bivens
claim in case involving cross-border showing based in part on prediction that such a claim could
“risk . . . undermining border security”).
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rules, and so forth. Having done so, the discussion then proceeds to show
why courts must sometimes engage in predictive factfinding to reach a
defensible conclusion, but in other cases need not do so.
A.

Categorizing Predictive Factfinding

1.

Predictions About Court-Made Rules Versus Predictions About
Legislative or Regulatory Actions

In many cases, the justices debate the potential effects of a new courtmade rule, such as a rule recognizing a constitutional right to physicianassisted suicide.131 In others, the Court makes a prediction about an
existing law, rule, or government practice, such as a requirement that
newspapers print political candidates’ responses to criticism.132 Though
most relevant cases involve a law and an intertwined potential court rule,
the focus of the Court’s predictive factfinding may be on only one of the
two. For example, in Glucksberg, the Court decided whether to strike
down a law banning physician-assisted suicide in Washington133—if it
did, it would create a new constitutional rule. The Court’s predictive
analysis focused on the potential effects of the proposed constitutional
rule, not the existing law.134
The Court has not distinguished between these types of predictive
factfinding, and both types may raise some of the same problems.
However, the distinction is worth noting because a reviewing court’s
method of arriving at legislative facts, including predictive facts, should
differ in the two types of cases. If a court is reviewing a law or agency
rule, it may be able to refer to some evidence relied upon by the legislature
or agency when making its decision; if the law is not brand new, the court
could also review evidence about its application and ask whether the
potential predicted effects have thus far occurred. And the Supreme Court
has made clear that when the legislature has made an explicit prediction,
it is entitled to some deference.135 A judicial minimalist might even argue
that courts should presume that legislatures have implicitly determined
that statutes will not have an unconstitutional effect and therefore should
be invalidated only if there is a very strong reason to believe that the

131. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
132. Here, I refer to laws that do not contain an explicit predictive judgment by a legislature or
agency. See infra section III.B (distinguishing between laws with explicit predictive judgments and
those without).
133. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705–07.
134. Id. at 731–35.
135. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
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court’s own contrary prediction will come true.136
A court predicting the effect of its own rule is on somewhat different
ground. In such cases, such as when the Court decides whether to apply
the exclusionary rule in a Fourth Amendment case, it is likely that no
legislature or agency will have weighed in on the potential effects of the
rule; the court’s analysis must simply determine whether the rule will
carry out the mandate of a constitutional provision. The court may be more
likely to lack sufficient information to make predictions (or regular
findings of legislative fact) when it is considering a new court-made rule,
although it might have the option of looking to state courts and asking
whether a similar rule has been adopted.137 As discussed further in Part V,
a court creating a new rule with thin or nonexistent evidentiary support
should consider writing an opinion acknowledging some uncertainty and
preserving the possibility that new information could lead to a different
result in the future.
2.

Predictions That Allow Further Evidentiary Development Versus
Those That Stop Experimentation

Some predictive facts that become precedent are also essentially
immunized from evidentiary testing because of the Supreme Court’s
holding. If the prediction is made in the majority opinion, it often
addresses what would happen if the Court made a different decision.138 If
the decision holds that a certain practice is unconstitutional, it might be
illegal nationwide to engage in the disputed activity, therefore preventing
empirical testing.139 In McDonnell, for instance, the Court’s opinion
strongly suggested that any attempt to read federal corruption law broadly
should be invalidated because of the Court’s prediction about political
consequences,140 and courts have understood its constitutional analysis as
controlling.141 It is therefore likely that any lower court would prevent a
136. See generally Richard M. Re, “Equal Right to the Poor,” 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1149, 1216
(2017) (arguing for recognition of equal right principle but noting that “federal courts’ institutional
limitations might still warrant judicial restraint or deference to the political branches, particularly
when equal protection claims depend on predictions or contestable empirics”).
137. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734–35.
138. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and
the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 276 (1999) (noting that some doctrine hinges on the
“world we can expect under a particular legal regime”).
139. Cass Sunstein has called this practice “maximalist invalidation.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 30 (1999).
140. McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016).
141. See United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x 733, 736–37 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that the court
was “obliged to identify error” in jury instructions because of McDonnell’s conclusion that
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prosecutor from applying a state or federal corruption law in the manner
the prosecutors did in McDonnell, thereby making it impossible to even
gather new data to assess whether the Court’s predictive factfinding was
correct. Likewise, in striking down the right-of-reply statute in Tornillo,
the Court effectively prevented any state from enacting a similar law and
foreclosed any test of whether such a law would in fact reduce political
coverage in newspapers.142 In other words, in a single case, the Court can
make a prediction that raises a new factual question but simultaneously
thwarts any effort to test whether the prediction will come true.143
Conversely, some decisions, often those that refuse to recognize a
constitutional right, allow for further factual development that could
eventually change the Court’s decision. Many cases fall within this
category, and some, like Washington v. Glucksberg and United States v.
Leon,144 discussed further in Part V, even explicitly recognize that future
evidence may lead the Court to change its opinion.145
The distinction between these two types of cases may be important
when the Court is considering whether a prediction is necessary or
advisable, because an incorrect decision that forecloses future factual
development will be more difficult to revisit. The Court has
acknowledged a similar phenomenon in explaining its reluctance to accept
predictions made in facial challenges, noting that such forecasts “threaten
to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the
will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with
the Constitution.”146 A court that recognizes a risk of indefinitely
foreclosing experimentation may have the tools to reach the same result
without making a prediction.147

instructions “raise[d] ‘significant constitutional concerns’”); Nelson v. United States, No. 3:16-cv1434-J-32JBT, 2019 WL 1763226, at *4 n.10 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2019) (explaining that definition
of “official acts” was “cabined by the constitutional concerns identified in McDonnell”).
142. Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
143. A similar problem occurs when the Court refuses to recognize a constitutional right because
it might lead to a flood of litigation—lower courts would also refuse to recognize that right, and the
Court’s prediction would be difficult to disprove. In such cases, a state could subsequently recognize
the right that the Court refused to recognize and then its experience would create data on whether the
flood of litigation occurred. Thus, there is at least a theoretical chance that the Supreme Court would
overrule its decision on that basis.
144. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
145. Id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
146. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451 (2008).
147. See infra Part V.
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Standard Doctrinal Predictions Versus Predictions About SecondOrder Concerns

Many predictions discussed herein are central to the doctrinal questions
raised by the parties, like the Fourth Amendment analysis in Hudson v.
Michigan.148 But the Court’s predictive factfinding is sometimes less
obviously tethered to the principal questions presented by the case. In
other words, the prediction centers on second-order concerns, or ones that
are not directly or necessarily raised by the constitutional or statutory
question at issue. These predictions, such as the prevalent “flood of
litigation” forecasts in cases like Caperton and Williams-Yulee, often raise
worries about the functioning of the Court itself or the judiciary as a
whole. There is some debate about whether the Court should take such
considerations into account when formulating constitutional rights;149 if
one believes that those considerations are improper or less important, that
is reason to argue that any predictions about them are unnecessary.150 But
putting to one side the merits of that debate, one can at least recognize that
if the Court decides a case relying on a prediction relating to a secondorder concern, the parties may never get a chance to litigate the
question.151 However, the Court understandably has a special concern for
how its legal decisions will affect the judiciary; unlike a prediction about
the effect of a statute, it may be that no other body has seriously
considered how a proposed rule would affect the court system. These
considerations are important to keep in mind when assessing the problems
with predictive factfinding and contemplating solutions.
4.

Explicit Predictions Versus Implicit Predictions

The cases discussed in Part II all contained explicit discussions about
the future. But it is important to recognize that other cases, including some
of the most influential decisions in recent history, rest on significant
implicit predictive facts. In Miranda v. Arizona,152 the Court “essentially
made a ‘predictive’ factual determination that in future cases courts would
have a difficult time discovering whether a confession was voluntarily
communicated.”153 Similarly, the exclusionary rule extended to the states

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006).
See Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1056 (2013).
See infra section III.B.
See infra section IV.C.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Michael Edmund O’Neill, Undoing Miranda, 2000 BYU L. REV. 185, 281.
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in Mapp v. Ohio154 was implicitly based, at least in part, on the prediction
that potential suppression of evidence would lead police to more diligently
follow the commands of the Fourth Amendment.155 And in Shelby County
v. Holder,156 the case in which the Court struck down the preclearance
provision of the Voting Rights Act, the majority implicitly projected that
if the law was invalidated, previously-covered jurisdictions would not use
their newfound freedom to pass laws to prevent Black Americans
from voting.157
It may be less likely that a court making an implicit prediction is
attempting to avoid the appearance of reaching a conclusion of legislative
fact without supporting evidence. However, implicit predictions may be
incorrect, just like explicit ones. While the following Parts do not focus
on implicit predictions, their existence is important to remember because
any solution to predictive factfinding will fail if it simply pushes courts to
make predictions implicit.
B.

The Varied Necessity of Predictive Factfinding

It is critical to acknowledge that courts must predict legislative facts
quite often.158 Unremarkable predictions exist in almost any case
involving legislative facts, because any time a court relies on data to find
a regular legislative fact it is implicitly assuming that the data still
accurately describe the world and will continue to do so into the
immediate future.159 Similarly, courts often review legislation intended to
154. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
155. Anders Walker, “To Corral and Control the Ghetto”: Stop, Frisk, and the Geography of
Freedom, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1223, 1240 (2014) (“Rather than predict police corruption, the Court
seemed convinced that Mapp would diminish it.”); Stoughton, supra note 21, at 860 (explaining that
with regard to the exclusionary rule, “the Court has adopted the view, at least implicitly, that officers
will respond if courts reduce or eliminate the possibility of conviction”).
156. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
157. See id. at 547–50. As discussed above, any court decision will contain some implicit
predictions, such as the inherent prediction that a problem the government is trying to solve will
continue if no action is taken to solve the problem. The implicit predictions discussed here are more
controversial and less certain.
158. Even more obviously, courts must frequently make predictions of adjudicative fact. For
example, a judge deciding whether to release a defendant before trial or keep him in jail is predicting
whether that defendant will return to court, and, perhaps, whether he will commit a serious crime
before trial. Certainly, study of judges’ methods for making predictions about such questions of
adjudicative fact is vital, but such predictions are not the focus of this Article. See generally Douglas
Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 197 (2003)
(discussing how a judge considering whether to grant preliminary injunction must consider likelihood
of irreparable harm to plaintiff).
159. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement
Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 830 (2005) (“Legislative facts involve generalizations, usually
predictive, about human behavior.”).
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ameliorate a societal harm, and in most cases the court will assume that
the harm would not disappear on its own without the legislation.160 Such
predictions are worth thinking about, but they are not the subject of
this Article.
Courts also sometimes engage in predictive factfinding because the
statute or rule at issue is itself based on an explicit prediction, and the
court needs to determine whether that prediction is acceptable.
Lawmakers must attempt to solve incipient problems, and courts
unavoidably play a role in reviewing the predictions that legislatures
make. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner II),161 for
instance, the Court twice reviewed a federal law requiring cable
companies to carry some local broadcast channels.162 That law was based
on an explicit predictive judgment that cable dominance would threaten
the existence of free broadcast television absent an intervention by
Congress. In some cases of this type, a legislative body makes a forecast
and the reviewing court is simply obligated to determine whether the
lawmakers “had substantial evidence” to support it.163 In such cases, at
least nominally, the court’s task is not to “reweigh the evidence de novo,
or to replace Congress’ factual predictions with [its] own.”164
This Article is primarily concerned with the cases that do not fall into
the two categories just mentioned. Instead, it addresses those that involve
an explicit court prediction that does not relate to an explicitly predictive
legislative judgment—for example, whether a broad understanding of a
corruption law will reduce interaction between elected officials and
citizens. In many of these cases, despite the absence of a legislative
prediction, a primary issue in the case turns on a question of predictive

160. For example, if the Court accepts the uncontroversial legislative fact that the threat of potential
imprisonment deters speech, it is inherently predicting that the same will hold true after its decision
is made, at least in the short term. See Benjamin, supra note 39, at 304; see also Wistrich, supra
note 123, at 751 (“[A] statute may be future-oriented in the sense that it is based on a prediction about
what will be most conducive to future societal welfare but, paradoxically, may lock in that
future-oriented rule for a long period of time so that the rule stays in effect even when the prediction
about the future on which it is based becomes obsolete.”).
161. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
162. Id.; Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
163. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 208.
164. Id. at 211 (citing Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666); see Benjamin, supra note 39, at 301–02
(discussing Turner I). In other cases, such as antitrust cases, the court is called upon to “assess
competing economic theories and predictive judgments” without applying the same level of
deference. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 207. As demonstrated in Turner II, courts reviewing legislative
predictions can consult the legislative record and may defer to the legislature’s assessment of
empirical evidence. Courts making freestanding predictive judgments cannot apply deference, and
they may rely on their own research or facts presented by litigants when making forecasts.
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fact.165 In constitutional cases in this class, the court’s decision about the
government’s interest supporting a law or government practice will
depend on its own prediction about how the law might serve that
interest.166 In certain criminal cases, for example, a court may need to
predict whether extension of the exclusionary rule would encourage
police to better adhere to the Fourth Amendment.167
As discussed in section I.B, cases involving challenges to laws that
have not yet been implemented may directly present issues of predictive
fact most often. In Washington State Grange v. Washington State
Republican Party, for instance, political parties facially challenged a state
law that allowed a candidate to list a “party preference” on the ballot, with
the challengers positing that voters would incorrectly believe that the
party had endorsed that candidate.168 Thus, if the Court was to decide the
case before an election occurred, it had little choice but to engage in some
kind of prediction about how voters would interpret the messages on the
ballots, even if the only task was to gauge the likelihood of the plaintiffs’
prediction.169 Washington State Grange and similar cases could be
compared to cases involving review of an explicit legislative prediction,
since in both situations the Court is being called upon to review the
prediction of another entity. Of course, while a legislature’s prediction is
owed deference,170 a plaintiff’s prediction in a facial challenge that a
statute will have unconstitutional effects is often disfavored.171
As indicated in Part II, in other cases predictions are not as clearly
necessary, either because the Court has not established that it lacks
evidence to state a regular legislative fact or because the prediction is
made in dicta, when the Court could have rendered its holding without the

165. See Merrill, supra note 159, at 830 (stating that analysis of many constitutional provisions
requires “making predictive generalizations about future behavior” and that “[t]he Court has always
deferred to Congress in making such predictions”).
166. See Hashimoto, supra note 38, at 130 (“When the Court uses legislative facts, they are offered
as predictions about the effects of legal rules and are inherently disputable.”).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927–28 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(“[S]ee[ing] no way to avoid making an empirical judgment.”).
168. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 444 (2008).
169. The majority in Washington State Grange expressed a refusal to accept the plaintiffs’ “factual
assumptions” about voter confusion, which were no more than “sheer speculation.” Id. at 454–57.
While the Court commendably set a high evidentiary bar before accepting the plaintiffs’ prediction
of voter confusion, its own rejection of the plaintiffs’ argument unavoidably contained a forecast in
itself, and that forecast was based largely on case law. See id. at 454 (“[O]ur cases reflect a greater
faith in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves about campaign issues.”).
170. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994).
171. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 927–28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (agreeing with the holding
while noting the “provisional nature [of the Court’s] decisions”); see also Wash. State Grange, 552
U.S. at 455.
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prediction.172 In Citizens United v. FEC,173 for example, the Court
invalidated a federal ban on corporate spending in elections and declared
that the appearance of influence or access would “not cause the electorate
to lose faith in our democracy.”174 The Court did not ask whether there
was evidence that citizens of states without bans on corporate election
spending had less faith in democracy, thus failing to establish whether it
could have stated a regular legislative fact or made a prediction with
evidentiary support.
The question of necessity will be central to any effort to ameliorate the
negative effects of predictive factfinding. If a prediction is unavoidable, a
court may try to make a higher quality prediction or acknowledge its
uncertainty and encourage further factual development after the decision.
Yet if it is unnecessary, recognizing that even high-quality predictions are
fraught, the court may avoid engaging in forecasting altogether.
IV. THE PROBLEMS THAT PREDICTIVE FACTFINDING
CREATES
While some predictive factfinding is necessary, the Court’s method of
predictive factfinding leads to serious jurisprudential problems. Most
obviously, judges, like other human beings, are not especially adept at
predicting the future, so court predictions are often both wrong and
imprecise. Compounding that problem, incorrect predictions might
become factual precedents, such that lower courts feel bound to accept
them even if later developments indicate that they are incorrect. And the
adversarial model is weakened when appellate courts base their decisions
on predictive factfinding that did not occur at the trial court level, cutting
litigants out of the process and depriving courts of an important source of
information that should help them make the best decision possible.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s willingness to frequently engage in
predictive factfinding without citing evidence or acknowledging the
practice’s prevalence might damage the legitimacy of the judiciary.
A.

Courts’ Predictions Are Often Wrong and Almost Always
Imprecise
Human beings are poor predictors of the future.175 This ineptitude does

172. Separately, section III.A.3 addresses predictions about second-order concerns, such as flood
of litigation predictions, that some would argue are unnecessary. See supra section III.A.3.
173. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
174. Id. at 360.
175. See, e.g., Wistrich, supra note 123, at 802 n.354 (gathering sources for proposition that
humans, including justices of the Supreme Court, are bad at predicting the future).
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not only apply to laypeople: since 1990, “the track record of expert
forecasters—in science, in economics, in politics—is as dismal as
ever.”176 In one famous study that asked experts to predict geopolitical
events, researcher Philip Tetlock found that their assessments were
usually no better than those of “dart-throwing chimps.”177 Tetlock and
others have found that prediction accuracy can be improved with some
effort.178 First, it is important to set specific probabilities that a given event
will occur. It is also vital to avoid making predictions based on mere
hunches, to which experts are especially susceptible, and spurn
all-encompassing theories about a problem in favor of asking many
narrow factual questions about it.179
Realizing that the government has erred badly in making vital
predictions about foreign policy, federal agencies have begun to sponsor
efforts to better understand how specific methods can improve their
predictions.180 However, based on the cases discussed above, there is no
indication that judges engage in any efforts to improve their own
assessments of the future. Further, when social scientists have studied
certain judicial predictions of adjudicative fact, such as bail
determinations, judges have not performed particularly well. One recent
paper finds that judges regularly “mis-rank[] defendants,” releasing
48.5% of defendants in the riskiest group, over half of which will fail to
appear for court.181
All of this suggests that judges are probably not especially good at
making predictions of legislative fact. Though no one has thoroughly
studied the Supreme Court’s record on that front, and many predictions

176. David Epstein, The Particular Blindness of Experts, THE ATL. (June 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/06/how-to-predict-the-future/588040/
[https://perma.cc/BG7B-WKMX].
177. PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW CAN WE KNOW?
20 (Princeton Univ. Press course book ed. 2009).
178. PHILIP TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
PREDICTION 217–24 (2015).
179. Id.; see also David Brooks, Opinion, Forecasting Fox, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/opinion/brooks-forecasting-fox.html?searchResultPosition=1
[https://perma.cc/7KRE-VK6L].
180. See Steve LeVine, A Contest to Beat Geopolitical “Superforecasters,” AXIOS (May 14, 2019),
https://www.axios.com/geopolitical-forecasters-director-national-intelligence-563c45a4-8045-4efd88d6-3d4d836e3ef7.html [https://perma.cc/5XVW-YUL6]; TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 178,
at 229–30.
181. Kleinberg et al., supra note 44, at 4–5. Moreover, as discussed in section I.A, it is difficult for
judges to properly interpret empirical evidence in the first place, even if that data does not involve a
prediction. See supra section I.A.
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would be difficult to test,182 reviewing a few cases that involve testable
claims shows that justices have no extraordinary power to see the future.
In Clinton v. Jones, the Court decided that requiring a president to answer
to civil litigation while in office would be “highly unlikely to occupy any
substantial amount of [his] time.”183 As is well-known, a deposition in the
Clinton litigation led to an independent counsel investigation of President
Clinton’s extramarital affair, and the charge that he lied in the resulting
deposition served as a basis for his impeachment.184 Unsurprisingly,
commentators, including a judge, later denounced the prediction, calling
it “embarrassingly poor”185 and “epically incorrect.”186
The Caperton and Williams-Yulee opinions provide further evidence
that the Court’s forecasting ability is suspect. First, as the dissenting
opinion in Caperton noted, the United States v. Halper Court incorrectly
posited that its new rule applying the Double Jeopardy clause to civil cases
would be invoked rarely.187 And the Caperton majority itself was correct
that its decision would not lead to a flood of litigation, but the dissent,
which focused much more attention on predicting the decision’s effects,
was wrong. Despite that error becoming fairly obvious a few years after
Caperton was decided,188 the Williams-Yulee majority relied on the
Caperton dissent’s prediction as a reason to reject the petitioner’s claim
that judicial recusal rules could substitute for campaign solicitation

182. For example, determining whether Mapp’s exclusionary rule has led to stricter adherence to
the Fourth Amendment is the subject of ongoing debate. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 155, at 1224
(arguing that Mapp “encourag[ed] police to develop creative means of stopping suspects, including
techniques that involved intimidation and violence”). And the question of whether voters were
confused by the ballots in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party¸ 552 U.S.
442 (2008), would require targeted study. Because of the imprecise nature of those predictions, even
a clear answer to those questions might not shed much light on whether the prediction was accurate.
If, after Washington State Grange, a study showed that 10% of voters were somewhat confused by
the ballot design, there would be no way to determine whether that figure was above or below the
threshold the Court had in mind. See supra section IV.A.
183. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 702 (1997).
184. See Bill Barnhart, Justice Stevens and the News Media: An Exercise in Exposition, 106 NW.
U. L. REV. 657, 689 (2012).
185. Wistrich, supra note 123, at 802 n.354.
186. Barnhart, supra note 184, at 690 (quoting JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET
WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 118 (2007)).
187. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 900 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)).
188. N.Y.U. Sch. of L., supra note 96 (comments of Bradley Smith at 33:00).
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bans.189 These are just a handful of examples;190 a focused attempt to
document the Court’s predictions and gauge their accuracy might help
persuade the Court to more carefully examine how it makes predictions in
the future.
Even predictions that are not verifiably incorrect can be problematic
because they are usually imprecise, providing parties and the public with
little useful information about predictive facts’ exact role in the
jurisprudence. If the Court finds a predictive fact, it typically will not
attempt to discern how likely it is that the event in question will happen;
instead, it asserts that the result “might,” “would,” or “will” occur.191
Moreover, the Court often does not address the intertwined question of
the magnitude of the problem that could arise, or it simply worries that the
problem will occur “often” or in “some” or “many” cases.192 For example,
in Hudson v. Michigan, the majority did not endeavor to determine the
likelihood that application of the exclusionary rule would lead to police
hesitation and a resulting increase in destruction of evidence.193 Did the
justices believe that the result was inevitable, or that there was a 90%
chance it would occur, or maybe only a 60% chance? Assuming that the
Court was correct that evidence destruction would have increased some
amount, how much of an increase was necessary to justify using that
increase as a basis for a constitutional decision? And which party had the
responsibility to establish that an increase or lack of increase was likely?
If the state showed that fifty criminal cases would be dropped nationwide
each year if the exclusionary rule were applied to knock-and-announce
violations, would that be enough to justify the rule the Court decided

189. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 455 (2015) (“And a flood of postelection recusal
motions could ‘erode public confidence in judicial impartiality’ and thereby exacerbate the very
appearance problem the State is trying to solve.” (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 891 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting))); see also Caperton, 556 U.S. at 900 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the incorrect
prediction in Halper).
190. The Court also appears to have erred when predicting in Apodaca v. Oregon, that minority
viewpoints would be heard during jury deliberations even without a unanimity requirement. 406 U.S.
404, 413 (1972); see Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1261, 1311 (2000) (explaining that studies after Apodaca “indicate that nonunanimous voting
schemes are likely to chill participation by the precise groups whose exclusion the Court has
proscribed in other contexts”).
191. See, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016) (worrying
that citizens “might shrink from participating in democratic discourse”); Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) (predicting that “political and electoral coverage would be blunted
or reduced” if law were upheld); Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 413 (predicting that minority jurors’ “views
will be heard”).
192. See, e.g., Caperton, 556 U.S. at 891 (predicting unspecified “increase” in recusal motions);
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257 (suggesting that political coverage “would be blunted or reduced”).
193. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006).
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upon?194 The opinion provides no hint at the answer.195
Thus, the Court’s analysis almost always omits two fundamental parts
of any high-quality prediction: the likelihood that a predicted result will
occur and, if applicable, the predicted magnitude of the problem.196 To be
sure, few would argue that the Court should attach a percentage likelihood
to its predictions. It probably refuses to do so because such precision is
often almost impossible, and the justices may worry that if a precise
prediction were later disproven, it could lead to uncertainty in the law.
However, attempting to set specific probabilities is an important part of
developing accurate predictions197 and may deserve a role in courts’
decisionmaking processes, if not their opinions. In any event, the
difficulty of making precise forecasts does not necessarily mean that
making imprecise ones is the answer; rather, if a prediction cannot be
made with reliable accuracy, perhaps predictions should not be a principal
basis of law.
B.

Incorrect Predictions May Create Predictive Fact Precedent

Regardless of its accuracy or precision, a significant predictive fact that
provides the basis for a Supreme Court decision may become precedential
even if it is phrased as case-specific and even if it lacks evidentiary
support. As Allison Orr Larsen has explained, some legislative facts take
on precedential value, and courts may be unlikely to revisit holdings even
if facts change in the future.198 For example, in Nken v. Holder,199 the
Court’s opinion included a factual description about how immigration
officials handled post-deportation appeals decided in a noncitizen’s
favor.200 Though that legislative fact was later questioned, lower courts
frequently cited it as if it were precedent.201 This practice creates a
problem, both because facts may change and it might be later proven that

194. The lack of precision is not unique to predictions, and if the court announces an unsupported
finding of legislative fact, that will also leave unanswered questions about the nature of the fact stated.
But if a court supports a legislative fact with underlying data, that data will likely provide some
answers about the scope of the phenomenon described.
195. See Levy, supra note 149, at 1075 (maintaining that if a justice makes a flood of litigation
argument, “then that justice should make that case, presumably based on context-specific information,
such as how much time these cases consume and ultimately the extent to which they tend to prevent
law enforcement officials from performing their jobs”).
196. See TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 178, at 217–22.
197. Id.
198. See Larsen, supra note 8, at 102.
199. 556 U.S. 418 (2009).
200. Id. at 435; Larsen, supra note 8, at 63–64 (discussing Nken, 556 U.S. at 435).
201. Larsen, supra note 8, at 63–64; see also Pine, supra note 78, at 696.
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the fact was wrong in the first place.202
Some of the cases discussed in Part II have created predictive fact
precedent. After Tornillo, one might expect that a court reviewing a
different state’s right-of-reply statute would need to determine whether
Tornillo’s conclusion about discouraging political speech was contestable
based on empirical evidence specific to the jurisdiction in question.203
However, courts have simply cited Tornillo as controlling precedent for
decades without reviewing, or even mentioning, its predictive nature or
lack of empirical support.204 Similarly, in Buckley v. Valeo,205 the Court
invalidated limits on independent campaign spending in part because
“such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive,” thus
“alleviat[ing] the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro
quo.”206 While that prediction has been heavily criticized and is perhaps
not even believable to the Court’s current members who adhere to
Buckley,207 it has served as a foundational legislative fact in campaign
finance law for over forty years without any subsequent empirical testing
by the Supreme Court.208
The factual precedent problem is often exacerbated when predictive
facts become precedential, as it is more difficult to anticipate the future
than to assess current evidence,209 and in some circumstances there has
never been an opportunity to present empirical evidence to a court. This

202. See Benjamin, supra note 138, at 278–79 (discussing factual precedent created by Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)).
203. See Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
204. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 284 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (worrying that “longstanding and heretofore unchallenged opinions
such as” Tornillo were “in peril”); McDermott v. Ampersand Publ’g, LLC, 593 F.3d 950, 959 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citing Tornillo for the proposition that “[i]t is clear that the First Amendment erects a
barrier against government interference with a newspaper’s exercise of editorial control over its
content”).
205. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
206. Id. at 47, 49.
207. In McCutcheon v. FEC, the plurality found it unlikely that a donor would contribute to various
political action committees (PACs) to funnel money to a candidate because “[t]hat same donor,
meanwhile, could have spent unlimited funds on independent expenditures.” 572 U.S. 185, 214
(2014). The opinion acknowledged that previous decisions had concluded that independent spending
was less valuable, “[b]ut probably not by 95 percent.” Id.
208. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (“The absence of prearrangement and
coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the
expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47)).
209. See Benjamin, supra note 39, at 336 (“Predictive harms are not simply a matter of gathering
facts; one must attempt to move from what we currently know into a guess about future events.”); see
also supra section IV.A.
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phenomenon led one critic of Miranda to argue that if the Court has
engaged in predictive factfinding, “Congress may rely on its own
institutional superiority for fact-gathering to reject the Court’s assessment
of predictive facts and to modify the Court’s anticipatory remedy . . . .”210
But even if Congress has the power to overrule the Court’s predictive
facts, it may decide not to do so, leaving the issue to the judiciary.
However, the Court has shown no inclination to reconsider issues of
predictive fact, even if there are reasons to believe it may be wrong.
Williams-Yulee is an obvious example, where the majority adopted a
prediction made in Caperton even after it was clear that the prediction was
incorrect.211 And Clinton v. Jones has not been reconsidered despite its
controversial aftermath.212 In fact, though the Court has consistently
recognized that its holdings should change if underlying facts have
shifted, according to Stuart Minor Benjamin, as of 2000 the Court had
“never squarely reconsidered one of its cases on this basis.”213
Some may argue that adhering to predictive factual precedent is a price
worth paying for stability in the law—in the face of unknown facts,
sometimes the judiciary should choose a course of action and stick with
it.214 The same type of argument could be made as part of any broader
criticism of the use of empirical evidence in the law, and this Article is
not the place for a full-throated defense of the use of empiricism in judicial
decision making.215 Certainly, the stability concern counsels against

210. O’Neill, supra note 153, at 188.
211. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 455 (2015). But see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868, 900 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the Court’s decision to overrule
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), because its prediction was incorrect).
212. See Michael C. Dorf, How Damaging Is Clinton v. Jones to Trump’s Defense Against Various
Lawsuits?, TAKE CARE BLOG (May 1, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/how-damaging-isclinton-v-jones-to-trump-s-defense-against-various-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/8CA9-W5D5] (noting
that President Trump could challenge Clinton “on the ground that its underlying assumptions have
proven false,” but arguing that “it is not obvious that Clinton v. Jones was actually wrongly decided”
since Presidents Bush and Obama were not distracted by civil lawsuits).
213. Benjamin, supra note 39, at 319 n.146.
214. See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel
Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1172 (2005) (“The rule of law
depends on stability and thus willingly suffers the perpetuation of some incorrect rulings in exchange
for the benefit of stability and predictability of outcomes.”). For example, in Apodaca v. Oregon, the
Court affirmed two state convictions based on nonunanimous jury verdicts. 406 U.S. 404, 404 (1972).
Though empirical evidence since that decision shows such rules may discourage participation by
minority and women jurors, the Court did not overrule Apodaca until 2020, see Ramos v. Louisiana,
590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), perhaps because the justices believe that “[i]mportant policy
considerations of stability and coherence arguably favor such deference to precedent.”
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 190, at 1311 (arguing that Apodaca should be reconsidered).
215. See generally Meares, supra note 21 (responding to three criticisms to the use of empiricism
in criminal law and procedure).
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creating new precedent each time a novel scientific study is published.
Yet this Article principally argues that predictive factfinding is often
unnecessary, either because holdings rest on other grounds or the Court
has failed to examine available data. And reducing predictions will likely
enhance stability of law, at least in cases that are decided on more purely
legal grounds—if the Court more readily acknowledges that its rule
should be followed regardless of how the facts turn out, that rule will more
likely be followed and may be more difficult to change.216 However, in
the smaller set of cases that unavoidably turn on a prediction of legislative
fact,217 the interest in stability may be outweighed by the need to reach the
right conclusion; it is “difficult to defend” the position that decisions
should not be reconsidered “even if their factual underpinnings have been
undermined.”218 In any event, the Court can make that decision on a
case-by-case basis, just as it does when deciding whether to overrule
any precedent.
C.

Predictive Factfinding Threatens the Adversarial System

Article III of the Constitution envisions an adversarial system in which
federal courts decide only cases and controversies.219 Under this system,
advocates are supposed to present courts with the factual and legal
information they need to best reach the correct outcome. However,
Brianne Gorod has convincingly argued that in cases involving questions
of legislative fact, “appellate courts often look outside the record the
parties develop before the trial court, turning instead to their own
independent research and to amicus briefs, even though the resulting
factual findings will not have been thoroughly tested by the adversarial
process.”220 For example, in Citizens United the Supreme Court declared,
without any reference to the record, that “independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption.”221 And in some instances, the importance of
such facts may not be readily apparent at the trial level, meaning that the

216. See Larsen, supra note 8, at 109 (positing that the “factual finding” in Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010), was really a legal rule); see also infra Part V.
217. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732–35 (1997) (discussing state’s fear that
legalizing physician-assisted suicide would lead to involuntary euthanasia).
218. Benjamin, supra note 138, at 272.
219. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
220. See Gorod, supra note 26, at 4; see also Borgmann, supra note 25, at 1242 (“Finally, because
social facts are broad in nature and affect more than just the parties to a litigation, the parties may not
present all of the facts needed to resolve a question of social fact.”).
221. Gorod, supra note 26, at 29–30 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010)).
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parties have not even contested them.222
Predictive factfinding can be especially detrimental to the adversarial
system, completely cutting litigants out of the factfinding process,
especially when the prediction at issue has not been litigated below.223 As
demonstrated by the cases discussed above, Supreme Court predictive
factfinding often involves broad questions about the judicial or political
system that were not mentioned in the trial court’s decision. In
McDonnell, for instance, the lower courts were concerned principally with
statutory interpretation and more case-specific issues about Governor
McDonnell’s criminal trial, such as evidentiary rulings.224 The
government had little warning at the factfinding stage that it should
attempt to develop empirical evidence concerning whether its
interpretation of federal corruption law would chill political activity. The
issue was addressed at length in amicus briefs to the Supreme Court filed
in support of McDonnell,225 and any evidence-based response to those
arguments could not have been fully developed through the adversarial
process because of the government’s short timeframe (unless the Court
had decided to remand the case or provided time for further briefing).226
Similarly, in cases like Caperton that involve the predicted court-centered
effects of a certain rule, litigants may not know until they see an amicus
brief submitted to the Supreme Court that they could lose based on an
assertion that recognition of their claim would lead to a flood
of lawsuits.227
One might respond by arguing that in cases involving important
questions of predictive fact that may affect the whole nation, there is no
reason for the outcome to hinge on the quality of the litigants. Certainly,
there is a strong case to be made that the adversarial system is not ideal to

222. Larsen, supra note 29, at 1762, 1800–02 (“Less than a third of the factual claims [in amicus
briefs] credited by the Court were contested by the party briefs.”).
223. This will not occur in cases like Washington v. Glucksberg where the predictions about
coerced suicide served as the basis for the government’s purported interest in banning assisted suicide.
521 U.S. 702, 782–83 (1997).
224. See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 579 U.S. __, 136 S.
Ct. 2355 (2016).
225. See, e.g., Brief for Former Fed. Offs. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, McDonnell,
136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474) (arguing that affirming the conviction would “cast[ ] a cloud over
activities that are fundamental to the operation of a representative democracy”).
226. See Larsen, supra note 29, at 1801–02 (discussing the difficult position of litigants who have
short time and few words to respond to amicus briefs raising factual issues not already briefed).
227. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 223 W. Va. 624, 693–710, 679 S.E.2d 223 (2008)
(Benjamin, C.J., concurring) (discussing reasons for rejecting plaintiffs’ recusal motion without
raising flood of litigation concern).
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determine broad legislative questions, predictive or otherwise.228
Nonetheless, in a system that seeks to provide litigants the opportunity to
vigorously argue their cases, the deprivation of that chance is cause for
concern. If such vital issues are to be determined by court battles, having
two or more litigants’ perspective is better than one-sided briefing.
More broadly, the Court has not typically explained who bears the
burden of proving a predictive fact, creating confusion for litigants. As
discussed in Part I, scholars criticize the Court’s legislative factfinding
jurisprudence for inconsistently assigning burdens of proof regarding
legislative facts.229 And consistent with its pattern of letting predictions
operate as facts without performing true factual inquiries, the Court has
for the most part omitted any discussion of which party must prove an
issue of predictive fact,230 except in certain cases involving facial
challenges.231 This is unsurprising in some cases, because such a
discussion could highlight the parties’ unawareness that a certain
predictive fact was a central issue in the case. Yet it creates an obstacle to
litigants who must address an issue of predictive fact, perhaps because it
was raised in an amicus brief.232 Again using McDonnell as an example,
if an amicus brief predicts that a broad interpretation of a corruption law
will lead to less political interaction, the lack of clarity about who bears
the predictive burden means that the opposing party will not know
whether to rely on the lack of evidence supporting that claim or make a
last-ditch effort to demonstrate the claim’s falsehood.
D.

Finding Predictive Facts Without Citing Evidence May Undermine
the Court’s Legitimacy

A review of the case law discussed in Part II raises a concern that the
Court uses predictive factfinding in some circumstances when it seeks to
state a legislative fact but does not have the evidence to support that fact.
Even if the Court has not engaged in that practice consciously, its
predictive jurisprudence may damage its legitimacy if onlookers believe

228. See, e.g., Bryan L. Adamson, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(A) as an Ideological
Weapon?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1025, 1084 (2007) (arguing that the “validity, reliability, and
predictability” of legislative facts “can often be distorted in the adversarial context”).
229. See FAIGMAN, supra note 21, at 101–02.
230. See, e.g., Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887–90 (discussing defendant’s prediction of flood of
litigation and dismissing it without addressing burden of proof).
231. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 200 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(noting that the petitioners had a “heavy burden”).
232. An issue of predictive fact could also arise simply because a case has some overlap with a
previous Supreme Court decision that relied on a predictive fact, as occurred in Williams-Yulee v.
Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 454–55 (2015) (relying on a predictive fact from the Caperton dissent).
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that the Court has “disguise[d] the rationales” for its decisions.233 And
every prediction that is disproven adds weight to that concern.234 If a
Supreme Court justice has staked a constitutional right on his or her own
evidence-free prediction that turns out to be incorrect, that inspires little
confidence in the quality of decisionmaking.235 As Sanford Levinson and
Jack M. Balkin put it, “[i]f we think that judges are not particularly good
at predicting the future consequences of their decisions, we might think
twice about placing such confidence in their ability to exercise the powers
of judicial review fairly and wisely.”236 This same legitimacy concern also
arises with regular legislative factfinding,237 but probably not to the same
degree, since courts finding regular legislative facts are now presented
with more data and feel more obligated to use it.238 An opinion that states
a critical legislative fact (not phrased as a prediction) without any support
will almost certainly be a target of criticism;239 thus far, the same does not
appear to be true for a predictive fact. And if an opinion citing to a regular
legislative fact seems to manipulate evidence to reach a preconceived
result, that at least allows commentators to cite that same evidence when
analyzing the Court’s decision.
Similarly, the Court’s willingness to rely on predictions of dubious
accuracy, and the haphazard manner in which they are made, give the
233. Kathryn Judge, Judges and Judgment: In Praise of Instigators, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1077, 1095
n.57 (2019) (arguing that judicial avoidance combined with a tendency to mask the true reason for
that avoidance could contribute to a decrease in trust of the judiciary (citing LAWRENCE LESSIG,
AMERICA, COMPROMISED 1–3 (2018))).
234. This effect is likely magnified if the Court’s disproven prediction was made with unabashed
confidence and without an assessment of the prediction’s necessity. If the Court acknowledges
uncertainty but has a good reason to make a prediction anyway, as in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997), or United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), there is less reason to question the
Court’s methodology.
235. See Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 229, 237–38 (2010) (“In the end, whatever the likelihood that the dissents’ predictions [in
Caperton] will come true, one might question the wisdom of making bold predictions that may be
disproved over time, given concern about how the public perceives the Court’s legitimacy.”).
236. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, What Are the Facts of Marbury v. Madison?, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 255, 281 n.74 (2003).
237. See Hashimoto, supra note 38, at 128 (“Scholars have written voluminously about the Court’s
careless and result-oriented use of scientific information in constitutional opinions.”).
238. See Larsen, supra note 8, at 61 (“The Supreme Court is in the ‘throes of a widespread
empirical turn’; consequently, its opinions are chock-full of statistics, social science studies, and other
general statements of fact about the world.” (quoting Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism:
Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 118 (2003))).
239. For example, the Court was pilloried after declaring without evidence that corporate
independent expenditures “do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010); see Gorod, supra note 26, at 29–30; see also Alicia Bannon,
Judicial Elections After Citizens United, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 169, 175 (2018) (noting that Court’s
declaration was made “without any supportive facts in the record”).
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impression that many predictions are gratuitous.240 In other words, it
appears likely the Court has made up its mind on an issue and engages in
predictive factfinding as a post hoc rationalization for its decision.241
There are several reasons onlookers might draw this conclusion. First,
even if an opinion does not acknowledge uncertainty, Supreme Court
justices are undoubtedly aware that predictions are often wrong. If a
justice is truly undecided about a case and the decision turns on the
accuracy of a prediction, he or she would likely devote significant study
and discussion to that prediction. Without that time and attention, it is hard
to believe that a prediction is actually playing a role in the outcome.242
This is most easily seen in the numerous cases in which predictions are
made despite the fact that the holding rests on an independent ground,
such as in McDonnell or Tornillo.243 Part V discusses some ways in which
a court that is serious about making correct predictions might proceed.
V.

A MORE THOUGHTFUL PREDICTIVE JURISPRUDENCE

Predictive factfinding is unavoidable, but, as discussed, it can create
problems, especially when the Court uses it as a means to find legislative
facts without citing empirical evidence. However, in outlier cases like
Washington v. Glucksberg, discussed below, the Court has demonstrated
that predictive factfinding can be limited and tailored such that it will do
less damage to the Court, the judicial system, and those who must live
under the laws created by the courts. The suggestions made here are drawn
from the Court’s own jurisprudential tools, although some of those tools

240. Issacharoff, supra note 115, at 311–12 (asking whether judicial intervention in California
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), was legitimate and noting lack of evidence for claim
that parties would be incapacitated by the law).
241. Green, supra note 235, at 238 (arguing that if predictions are incorrect, “future readers may
come away with the impression that constitutional decision making has devolved into a game in which
Supreme Court justices make whatever contested predictions and unsubstantiated empirical
assumptions support their policy preferences”). Some scholars have argued that the Court’s
decisionmaking generally flows in the direction of public opinion, and, therefore, “the Court’s
reputation may depend, to a significant degree, on the justices’ skill at predicting the future.” Michael
J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1721, 1756
(2001).
242. In Brown v. Board of Education, a case often cited for its use of an empirical study (showing
the psychological effects of segregation on Black children), scholars have convincingly argued that
the Court’s cursory citation to the study shows that its decision was not truly based on the study’s
findings. 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954); see Faigman, supra note 19, at 566 (concluding that “it seems
clear that the studies were not necessary to the holding” in Brown).
243. As noted, the McDonnell Court’s holding was based on an interpretation of the federal statute
at issue, and its constitutional discussion and predictions were made in dicta. See 579 U.S. __, 136 S.
Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016). In Tornillo, the Court made a prediction and then concluded that its decision
would hold regardless of whether that prediction was correct. See 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
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are rarely used. Importantly, any change will rely on judges and litigants
recognizing the pervasive use of predictive factfinding and its flaws. Such
recognition may persuade the Supreme Court to engage in less predictive
factfinding, help bolster the Court’s legitimacy, lead to more just results,
and provide a fuller opportunity for parties to address issues of
legislative fact.
The best example of thoughtful predictive jurisprudence is found in
Justice Souter’s opinion in Glucksberg, a case in which the Court
reviewed a claim that Washington’s ban on physician-assisted suicide
violated the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights.244 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized an issue of predictive fact:
whether recognizing a right to physician-assisted suicide would threaten
vulnerable groups, such as “the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons”
who might succumb to outside pressure to end their lives.245 Because no
states allowed physician-assisted suicide at the time (except Oregon,
which had only recently legalized the practice), the Court referred to the
experience of the Netherlands, citing a Dutch government study finding
that euthanasia without explicit consent occurred relatively frequently.246
Based in part on the concern that the same problem would occur in the
United States if all citizens had a constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim.247
Justice Souter, in a quite lengthy opinion concurring in the judgment,
expanded on the Chief Justice’s predictive-fact analysis.248 He recognized
that a significant part of the state’s argument was that “any attempt to
confine a right of physician assistance to the circumstances presented by
these doctors is likely to fail.”249 In response to the plaintiffs’ contention
that “regulation with teeth” could prevent that result, Justice Souter
concluded that “at least at this moment there are reasons for caution in
predicting the effectiveness of the teeth proposed.”250 Like the majority,
he referred to the Netherlands, “the only place where experience with
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia has yielded empirical evidence

244. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997).
245. Id. at 731.
246. Id. at 734.
247. Id. at 735–36.
248. See Charles L. Barzun, Justice Souter’s Common Law, 104 VA. L. REV. 655, 671–72 (2018)
(arguing that Justice “Souter offered his most explicit articulation of the common law method in his
separate opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg” and discussing Souter’s method of “proceed[ing]
slowly and carefully”).
249. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 754 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
250. Id. at 785.
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about how such regulations might affect actual practice.”251 Though
Justice Souter recognized that the evidence was “contested,” and that
“[t]he day may come when we can say with some assurance which side is
right,” the uncertainty of the matter had to be resolved in favor of
the state.252
Justice Souter then addressed the more general question of how to
decide cases in which the “facts necessary to resolve the controversy are
not readily ascertainable through the judicial process; but they are more
readily subject to discovery through legislative factfinding and
experimentation.”253 Although many such issues can be decided before a
trial court, that was not true of the question presented in Glucksberg.254
And Justice Souter “question[ed] whether an independent front-line
investigation into the facts of a foreign country’s legal administration
[could] be soundly undertaken through American courtroom litigation.”255
Then, importantly, he concluded that either way the Court ruled, “events
could overtake its assumptions.”256 Because legislatures are more adept
than courts at answering such questions, experimentation should be
allowed and the Court should wait before taking action, but in the future,
with the benefit of more study, the plaintiffs could prevail.
As Part II demonstrates, Justice Souter’s opinion was a departure from
the Court’s typical predictive jurisprudence.257 Part of the reason may be
that the predictive fact at issue in Glucksberg was central to the case, and
the parties debated the issue and provided supportive empirical
research.258 But the considerations taken into account are instructive for
any attempt to build a more coherent and cautious predictive
jurisprudence, as discussed below.
The first step toward a more thoughtful predictive jurisprudence is an
251. Id.
252. Id. at 786–87.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 787.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See supra Part II. Glucksberg is not the only case in which a justice has considered how the
Court should handle predictions about the effect of a rule. In United States v. Leon, the Court declined
to apply the exclusionary rule when police relied on a warrant that later turned out to be defective.
468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). In a concurrence, Justice Blackmun recognized that the Court was making
an unavoidable empirical judgment, lamented the Court’s limited ability to discern legislative facts,
and concluded that “[i]f it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule results in a material change in police compliance with the
Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here.” Id. at 927–28
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
258. See supra section III.A.3. The same is true of cases in which a legislature makes an explicit
predictive judgment and the Court must review that judgment. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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awareness of the phenomenon of predictive factfinding and its potential
drawbacks. Though it is easy to find criticisms of individual instances of
Court speculation,259 neither the Court nor scholars have thoroughly
examined predictive factfinding as a phenomenon separate from
legislative factfinding; and while Justice Souter in Glucksberg recognized
the drawbacks of relying on unsupported predictions, neither his
concurrence nor any similar opinion has been used as a model in
subsequent cases. This Article tries to start filling that void, but it is also
necessary to more exhaustively document how often the Court relies on
predictions, how often those predictions lack empirical support, and the
circumstances in which the Court is likely to make predictions, among
other things. Increased awareness and criticism of predictive factfinding
would likely lead the Court to treat such factfinding differently, both by
avoiding unnecessary predictions and expending more effort to make
accurate predictions; simply applying more effort produces better results
in some contexts.260
There is no guarantee that justices who are aware of the problems of
predictive factfinding will respond to it, but there are several reasons to
believe they may.261 First, the Court has already expressed a general desire
to avoid certain facial challenges because they “often rest on
speculation,”262 and it has applied similar reasoning when explaining why
successful overbreadth claims should be rare.263 Revealing how many
additional cases rest on the same speculative foundation may persuade the
Court to curb its forecasting. Moreover, a similar change has happened in
the recent past, after academics began to seriously study legislative
factfinding and the use of empirical data. While the Court for centuries
made pronouncements of legislative fact without much pressure to
provide any support for those facts, sustained criticism of that practice in
the middle of the twentieth century appears to have led to greater reliance

259. See, e.g., Wistrich, supra note 123, at 802 n.354 (noting that predictions often fail and pointing
to specific instances of incorrect Supreme Court predictions).
260. See Elizabeth Creyer & William T. Ross, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Inferences in Choice: The
Mediating Effect of Cognitive Effort, 55 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 61, 71–75
(1993) (finding that hindsight bias was weakest when subjects tried hardest).
261. Academic criticism and commentary has influenced the Court to varying degrees over time.
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Foreword: Academic Influence on the Court, 98 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1193
(2012) (providing examples “of academics influencing the Court by dint of their writing”); Brent E.
Newton, Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First Century Supreme Court Justices:
An Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399, 404, 406–07 (2012) (finding that 37.1% of Supreme
Court cases included at least one citation to a law review article in first decade of 2000s and that the
rate of such citations had “declined significantly”).
262. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008).
263. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612–15 (1973).
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on empirical evidence.264
Likewise, if scholars, litigants, lower courts,265 and dissenting judges
persistently point to opinions in which courts make unsupported or
incorrect predictions, individual justices may take up the cause as well if
they want to write a particularly strong dissent. For example, if the next
time the Court majority makes a prediction that a holding would lead to
unmanageable levels of litigation, the dissenting justices might not only
counter the majority’s argument about the merits of that prediction, they
may also highlight the more general problematic nature of basing
American law on unsupported predictions that often turn out to
be wrong.266
A Supreme Court more cognizant of the drawbacks of predictive
factfinding may be motivated to employ a version of judicial minimalism
to reduce its reliance on broad predictions. In Cass Sunstein’s view, a
judicial minimalist takes account of her cognitive limitations, including
her inability to predict the consequences of her decisions.267 A minimalist
judge might issue a narrow ruling because she knows that she lacks
sufficient information to forecast what will happen because of that
decision and hopes to reduce the negative decision costs of an
unnecessarily broad ruling.268 In the simpler cases, this boils down to
refraining from making predictions in dicta. So in some cases, the path
toward minimalism is clear: in McDonnell, the principal part of the
Court’s decision reversed Governor McDonnell’s conviction on statutory
interpretation grounds, fully deciding the question at issue.269 The Court
then went on to raise questions about the constitutionality of the
government’s interpretation of the statute, stating concerns based largely
on an unsupported prediction that overzealous prosecution could lead to

264. See Stoughton, supra note 21, at 854.
265. Some scholars have argued that lower courts should be more willing to depart from Supreme
Court precedent if new factual information is presented. See Pine, supra note 78, at 712–13; see also
Larsen, supra note 8, at 62.
266. Often, when one Court faction criticizes the other for making a prediction, it questions the
validity of the prediction itself but not the practice of making predictions. See Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 328 (2009) (“Given these strategic considerations, and in light of the
experience in those States that already provide the same or similar protections to defendants, there is
little reason to believe that our decision today will commence the parade of horribles respondent and
the dissent predict.”). But see Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1349
(2016) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“We should not make
predictions about the future effects of Guidelines errors, particularly since some may misunderstand
those predictions as veiled directives.”).
267. SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 46–47.
268. Id.
269. McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2368 (2016).
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diminished healthy political activity.270 In Tornillo, too, the Court first
predicted that the right-of-reply statute might discourage controversial
coverage, but then concluded that “[e]ven if a newspaper would face no
additional costs to comply with a compulsory access law and would not
be forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a
reply,” the law would still violate the First Amendment.271 In both of these
cases, the Court could have reached its holding without making a
prediction at all.
In other cases, such as Hudson, courts may not be able to avoid
predictions altogether but may be able to rely on fewer predictions in their
decisions. There, the Court weighed the costs and benefits of applying the
exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce cases, a project that called for
predictive factfinding, or at the very least regular legislative factfinding.
The Court based its decision on three predictions: that extending the rule
would (1) lead to excessive constitutional litigation by defendants;
(2) increase “preventable violence” against police; and (3) lead to the
destruction of evidence in “many” cases.272 Because the Court was
balancing costs against benefits of extending the rule, it is possible that all
three of those predictions were necessary in order to reach the result. But
more likely, the Court could have reached the same result on the basis of
just one or two of the perceived costs of the rule. By minimizing the
number of predictions they make, courts could create the same legal rules
while reducing the risk to judicial legitimacy and the risk of creating
factual precedent based on an inaccurate forecast.
A court could curtail predictions not just by reducing the number of
issues it discusses, but by seeking empirical evidence when it otherwise
would have relied on an unsupported prediction, as it did in Glucksberg
and typically does in cases involving regular legislative factfinding.
Currently, predictions are often made on the implicit assumption that a
forecast is necessary because existing empirical evidence does not answer
a key question in the case. In Tornillo, the Court predicted the
consequences of the Florida right-of-reply statute even though it had been
in place for sixty years.273 Conversely, in Skinner v. Switzer,274 the Court
rejected a “floodgates” argument by looking to experience in the circuit
courts, where there was no “litigation flood or even rainfall.”275 In at least
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 2372.
Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006).
See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247.
562 U.S. 521 (2011).
Id. at 535; see also Levy, supra note 149, at 1074–75 (mentioning cases in which justices have
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some cases, asking the question of whether data exists will absolve the
court of the necessity of making any prediction. At times, that may require
requests for additional briefing, delaying a decision, but the
inconvenience of delay will often be outweighed by increased accuracy;
courts can make case-by-case decisions about whether the prospect of
better information outweighs the cost of delay.
If a court looks for data in an attempt to answer a question and fails to
find that data, it can still respond in ways that avoid some of the pitfalls
of predictive factfinding. First, the Supreme Court could place a higher
burden on all arguments relying on predictive facts, as it has done in cases
involving “speculat[ive]” facial claims, like Washington State Grange.276
This would weigh the scales against formulating law based on
unsupported predictive facts while still recognizing that predictions are
sometimes necessary and can be valid bases for decisions if they are
especially persuasive.
In cases in which a court must answer a predictive empirical question,
there is also room for improvement. First, as a long-term goal, judges may
be able to increase the accuracy of their predictions through training and
education. Other parts of the federal government believe that sustained
study of forecasting is helpful,277 and considering the significance of
predictions to American law, the judiciary may be inclined to agree.
When appellate courts confront a question of predictive fact that has
not been litigated, they should consider remanding to the trial court for
further factual development.278 Though that tool is rarely used, the Court
has long recognized it as an option when the parties have not addressed
an issue that will decide a case of national importance.279 The Court used
a version of this option in Turner I, a case in which it was asked to decide
whether a federal law requiring cable companies to carry local broadcast

considered “past experience with the same kind of claims” when discussing potential flood of
litigation).
276. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008); see also
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 200 (2008) (plurality opinion).
277. See, e.g., LeVine, supra note 180 (discussing forecasting competitions run by the United
States intelligence services).
278. See Borgmann, supra note 25, at 1242 (arguing that when parties have not briefed an issue but
an appellate court may decide an issue of legislative fact, “they should remand the issue if possible
and at the very least allow both parties the opportunity to brief the issue fully”).
279. See Borden’s Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 208, 213 (1934) (challenging price
controls on milk, remanding to district court to determine “particular trade conditions in the city of
New York”); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1924) (remanding to D.C. court to
determine whether there was exigency justifying rent control); see also Borgmann, supra note 25, at
1244 (discussing remand in Borden’s Farm Products).
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stations violated the First Amendment.280 The Court applied intermediate
scrutiny and accepted that the government’s goal of helping broadcast
stations survive was important.281 However, it remanded the case to the
district court, concluding that it lacked sufficient record material to
demonstrate whether Congress’s conclusion that broadcast television was
truly in jeopardy was well-supported.282 While the Court was criticized
for requiring too much on-the-record congressional factfinding, if one
were to accept that standard, use of a remand to ensure thorough review
might be the only acceptable option. And applying that tool to predictive
judgments discussed in this Article would serve the goals promoted herein
by allowing the Court to acknowledge its uncertainty and preserve its
legitimacy while also letting litigants address questions of predictive fact
before receiving a final decision.283
The remand envisioned here would differ from that in Turner, since the
Turner Court was reviewing an explicit predictive judgment by Congress.
In cases like Caperton and Hudson, which addressed the potential effects
of a court-made rule,284 the Court arrived at its own prediction without the
benefit of any legislative record. Thus, remand would be even more
useful, perhaps providing a first empirical look at a question of
fundamental importance. While unnecessary delay may counsel against
remand in some cases, many cases come to the Court after years of
application of a certain legal regime; as noted, the law in Tornillo had
applied for sixty years.285 And any Supreme Court decision will create
precedent for years to come, meaning that sometimes a delay of two or
three more years may be justified if it helps the Court reach the right
answer and preserve its own legitimacy.
If remand is not an option or has already happened and an appellate
court is compelled to make a prediction, it should recognize the
uncertainty inherent in predictive factfinding when issuing its opinion—a
carefully-phrased opinion may reduce factual precedent and shape future
litigation that is more likely to reach the right result. In Citizens United,
the Court predicted that the appearance of influence or access would “not

280. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); see A. Christopher Bryant, The Empirical Judiciary, 25 CONST.
COMMENT. 467, 478–80 (2009) (reviewing FAIGMAN, supra note 21 (discussing remand in Turner
I)); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 598–99 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“When a key issue has ‘no evidence’ on one side and ‘no reason to believe’ the other, it
is a good indication that we should vacate for further consideration.”).
281. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662–63.
282. Id. at 668.
283. See Benjamin, supra note 138, at 327–28.
284. See supra section III.A.1.
285. Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247 (1974).
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cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”286 That statement not
only garnered widespread criticism,287 but it also engenders significant
confusion about the precedential status of the Court’s statement.288
Assuming that the Court did not possess evidence from states that already
allowed unlimited corporate spending, it could have reached the same
conclusion by stating that “on the current record, there is no significant
support for the conclusion that the appearance of influence or access will
cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.” Such phrasing could
protect the Court’s legitimacy by avoiding the very real possibility that
the prediction would be proven wrong. And, at least nominally, it would
leave the issue open to relitigation if evidence of lost faith in democracy
arose in the intervening years.289 However, if the Court had sought to
create a precedent that would not depend on whether corporate election
spending actually led to decreased faith in democracy, it could have
omitted the prediction from its opinion and reached the same conclusion
without relying on a predictive fact.
Similarly, in some cases—only those in which a court believes that the
interest in stability is outweighed by the need to reach a correct
conclusion290—the court could go further and invite future litigation by
stating that its opinion might change if new evidence is developed.291 The
concurring opinions in Glucksberg and Leon followed that model, frankly
acknowledging the Court’s uncertainty about a predictive question and
recognizing that new information could change the Court’s opinion.292 In
286. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).
287. See id. at 450 n.64 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (responding that
“[t]he electorate itself has consistently indicated otherwise, both in opinion polls . . . and in the laws
its representatives have passed . . .”).
288. See Larsen, supra note 8, at 109 (“Perhaps the ‘factual finding’ in Citizens United about
corporate election expenditures was not actually a finding of fact but, instead, was just part of the
Court’s legal rule.”).
289. See FAIGMAN, supra note 21, at 97 (stating that reviewable facts are “likely to be the subject
of sustained empirical attention from social scientists. As they become better understood, courts
should be willing to revisit precedent that was based on outmoded empirical beliefs.”).
290. See supra section IV.B.
291. Though courts do not often invite litigants to bring cases identical to the case just decided,
they do often invite future as-applied challenges when reviewing facial constitutional challenges. See,
e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 97 n.131 (1976) (“In rejecting appellants’ arguments, we of course
do not rule out the possibility of concluding in some future case, upon an appropriate factual
demonstration, that the public financing system invidiously discriminates against nonmajor parties.”).
292. See Bryant, supra note 280, at 481 (“Souter’s opinion [in Glucksberg] raises [the question of]
whether, and, if so, when it is appropriate for a court to defer a constitutional ruling in a justiciable
case because of the sort of factual uncertainty that proved dispositive to Souter in Glucksberg.”);
Barzun, supra note 248, at 674–75 (contending that in light of Justice Souter’s understanding of
common law, “we should not be surprised that [he] refused to decide the constitutional question posed
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Leon, Justice Blackmun concluded that “[i]f it should emerge from
experience that, contrary to our expectations, the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule results in a material change in police compliance
with the Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have
undertaken here.”293 Similarly, in Maine v. Taylor,294 a case in which the
Court decided whether Maine’s ban on importation of live baitfish
violated the Commerce clause, the Court first affirmed the district court’s
finding that no procedure existed to determine whether imported baitfish
contained parasites. The Court then noted that “if and when such
procedures are developed, Maine no longer may be able to justify its
import ban.”295
Michael Dorf has suggested a formalized version of this practice in
which “the Court could expressly designate some of its decisions . . . as
subject to experiment” or “designate some doctrines or decisions as
provisional, promising to revisit these matters at some future date.”296 By
making such statements explicit, the Court could help ensure that lower
courts engage in their own factfinding and do not simply adhere to factual
precedent.297 Provisional adjudication would have been particularly
appropriate in Rucho v. Common Cause, a 2019 case in which the Court
held that partisan gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable based on a
prediction that if courts could consider such claims, judicial “intervention
would be unlimited in scope and duration—it would recur over and over
again around the country with each new round of districting.”298 But just
after it made that prediction, the Court acknowledged that some state
by assisted suicide once and for all,” even though the state’s interest was sufficient at the time of the
decision).
293. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
294. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
295. Id. at 147. The Court has consistently recognized that legal rules may change if the facts on
which they are based have changed. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153
(1938) (“Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked
depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject
of judicial inquiry . . . and the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a
particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to
exist.”). But as noted above, as of 2000, the Court had “never squarely reconsidered one of its cases
on this basis.” Benjamin, supra note 39, at 319 n.146.
296. Dorf, supra note 63, at 73.
297. More generally, the judiciary would benefit from standardized decisional rules about
predictive factfinding and legislative factfinding more generally. The Court has not adopted such
standards, and it has been inconsistent about which party has the burden to prove legislative facts. See
sources cited supra note 34 and accompanying text. The same is true of predictive facts, and guidance
about which party has the burden to establish a predictive fact would assist litigants and perhaps
reduce the fear that predictive factfinding is sometimes used to disguise the Court’s true rationale for
decisions.
298. Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019).
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courts had begun to strike down partisan gerrymanders on state law
grounds.299 Rather than risk being proven wrong, the Court could have
refused to consider partisan gerrymandering claims in the short term but
acknowledged the necessity of reconsidering the issue in future decades
when states’ experiences could be reviewed.300
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has frequently relied on broad predictions in its
opinions. These predictions are not facts themselves, but they have served
as stand-ins for legislative facts. However, the Court has often failed to
cite evidence or perform a sustained inquiry before basing a decision on a
prediction. This phenomenon causes significant problems but has largely
gone unnoticed. Further recognition and study of the practice may help
courts reduce reliance on evidence-free predictions and encourage them
to remand more cases or take other necessary measures before enshrining
an untested prediction into law. In the end, such a practice could help
courts reach more accurate results and preserve the judiciary’s legitimacy.

299. Id. (citing League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015)).
300. Famously, Justice Kennedy took a similar approach in Vieth v. Jubelirer, yet he did not
specifically refer to the possibility that state court experience could help determine whether partisan
gerrymandering litigation would lead to unending litigation and judicial intervention into politics. 541
U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If workable standards do emerge
to measure these burdens, however, courts should be prepared to order relief.”).

